Navigating a Fractured World: How the Next UN Chief Can Revive Peace Efforts

The contest to lead the United Nations is shifting from a predictable process to a contentious one. Repeated straw polls by the Security Council have failed to identify a candidate acceptable to its five permanent members, leading to the emergence of new contenders, including the UAE’s Lana Nusseibeh. Whoever succeeds Antonio Guterres at the end of December will undoubtedly merit congratulations, having been chosen by a council that struggles to agree on most other matters. This individual should cherish the title of the 10th secretary-general, as while the UN Charter grants significant prestige, the role's actual power is contingent upon concessions from powerful states. The pressing question for the future incumbent is how to advance the UN's foundational mission of ending wars. This is particularly acute in a world grappling with 65 state-based conflicts, the highest number since the UN's inception 80 years ago, including eight interstate wars—a doubling from the previous year. Furthermore, with nearly 250,000 deaths attributed to organised violence, this period marks the bloodiest since the 1994 Rwanda genocide. The escalating deaths from one-sided attacks on civilians, at their highest in decades, are accompanied by widespread brutalities as international law's safeguards are increasingly disregarded. Compounding these challenges, the UN faces a reduced budget, fewer peacekeepers, a divided Security Council, and a diminished mediating role ceded to other actors, rendering it less capable. The incoming secretary-general, likely to be idealistic and energetic, will face a starkly different reality from their previous diplomatic or political experiences. From the vantage point of the UN headquarters in New York, the global landscape appears less like a map and more like a kaleidoscope. While the Cold War blocs have dissolved, the subsequent American-centric order has fragmented into shifting patterns. The new international order demands navigation through a complex web where states simultaneously engage with multiple, often competing, blocs. For instance, India participates in the Quad with Washington, aligns with Moscow and Beijing in Brics, and procures oil from Russia and aircraft from France. Similarly, the UAE balances Brics membership, a security partnership with the US, and the Abraham Accords, alongside trade agreements across Africa and Asia. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Indonesia, Brazil, and South Africa are all adept at engaging with diverse partners. Meanwhile, Washington exhibits friction with European allies as readily as with rivals, and Russia and China maintain a wary cooperative relationship. Nations are increasingly adopting a strategy of 'strategic autonomy with pragmatism,' seeking to avoid reliance on fickle patrons. This translates to a reduced emphasis on fixed alliances and a greater focus on 'pop-up' coalitions formed around specific issues. As Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney aptly stated, "If you are not at the table, you are on the menu." The UN secretary-general, however, is perpetually on everyone's menu, and more critically, will observe crucial decision-making tables being set elsewhere. Peace initiatives are now frequently orchestrated in Washington, Doha, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Cairo, and Ankara, with ad-hoc platforms like the Gaza Board of Peace and the Sudan Quad emerging. The UN chief is often summoned not as a primary architect but as a facilitator—to formalise agreements, provide logistical support, and manage the aftermath. To navigate this reality, the new secretary-general could draw upon the experiences of predecessors and consider a set of recommendations. Historical figures like Trygve Lie faced Soviet boycotts for UN intervention in Korea, while Dag Hammarskjold died on a mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo. U Thant utilized back-channel diplomacy during the Cuban missile crisis but faced estrangement from Washington for publicly advocating an end to the Vietnam War. Kurt Waldheim's tenure was later marred by revelations of his Nazi past. Javier Perez de Cuellar was known for his measured approach and quiet facilitation of human rights initiatives. Boutros Boutros-Ghali championed preventive diplomacy but was vetoed for a second term due to his outspokenness. Kofi Annan faced criticism for UN failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica, despite initial flexibility with Western Security Council members regarding NATO intervention in Bosnia. Ban Ki-moon focused on climate activism, while Antonio Guterres navigated American funding cuts and multilateralism challenges, particularly concerning Gaza. The new incumbent should accept a demotion in perceived authority, understanding that a secretary-general acting as if the UN remains the central orchestrator will be overlooked. Embracing the role of a 'head waiter' overseeing all tables can foster alliances with states excluded from major negotiations, who fear being 'on the menu' themselves. By accommodating smaller states and civilians often absent from negotiations, the secretary-general can gain influence beyond the Charter's provisions. The strategy should be to focus on areas of 'comparative advantage'—conflicts where no permanent member has a decisive stake and where regional actors seek resolution, such as Sudan, Myanmar, Yemen, and Haiti, while observing developments in Ukraine or Gaza. Article 99 of the UN Charter, which allows the secretary-general to bring threats to peace before the Security Council, should be used more routinely, as Antonio Guterres did once over Gaza in 2023. Modern ceasefires, often mere public relations tactics, should not be endorsed by the UN without clear process milestones, independent verification, and enforceable humanitarian access, to preserve the UN's crucial currency of legitimacy. A robust safety code, including protection for civilians, no amnesty for atrocity crimes, consultation with affected populations, and a path to justice, must be insisted upon for any transactional peace deals. Publicly grading these deals, akin to restaurant inspections, would allow for informed choices. Improving 'customer service' by deploying fewer, younger, better-trained, and supported envoys, rather than 'haughty politicians past their prime,' could set a new tone. Peacemaking, being the most cost-effective UN activity with the greatest potential returns, should be protected from budget cuts. The era of large-scale peacekeeping is past; the UN should act as a licensor and inspector, potentially through regional peacekeepers under UN mandates and standards, as agreed in principle for African Union operations. Listening to humanitarian workers on the frontlines, who possess invaluable insights into access and protection, is crucial. The secretary-general must judiciously choose battles, balancing independence with the need for respect, to avoid premature marginalisation. Visiting all active war zones in the first year, not for photo opportunities but to gain moral authority, is essential. In an era of fluid international relations, the secretary-general must be more present and less detached. While the UN's direct power to end wars may have diminished, its capacity to make them resolvable by supporting other parties' deals, assisting forgotten populations, and aiding those harmed remains significant. In a world where powerful nations strike deals over the heads of the less powerful, this role is far from insignificant and could be the most valuable contribution of the next secretary-general, provided they possess the humility to undertake it.