Geopolitical Shifts: Israel, Turkiye, and the Changing Middle East Order

On Tuesday, Israeli fighter jets launched an attack on the Abu al-Duhur airbase located in northwestern Syria, an event that drew swift condemnations from the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and various regional nations. The Israeli government defended the strike by claiming it possessed intelligence regarding Turkish military movements at the location. In a subsequent interview, US Ambassador to Turkiye and Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack revealed that Washington had received this intelligence from Israel six days prior to the strike. Nevertheless, independent due diligence conducted by US intelligence found no factual basis to support the claim. This incident not only highlights shifting dynamics between Turkiye and Israel but also points to a broader regional reordering where Israel is no longer at the center.

Ankara viewed the strike on the Syrian base as a deliberate provocation, yet it chose not to escalate the situation, opting instead to provide an off-ramp. Rather than framing the issue bilaterally, Turkiye positioned it as a matter between Israel, the US, and the wider international and regional consensus. Typically, a deconfliction mechanism exists between Turkiye and Israel. However, as noted by Tom Barrack, Israel failed to issue a warning to Turkiye about the operation, a step that could have easily provoked a direct military reaction. While the US envoy advocated for a deconfliction mechanism, such frameworks only function when all participating parties desire de-escalation. In this scenario, evidence suggests Israel had no interest in lowering tensions, potentially seeking escalation instead. By notifying neither Turkiye nor the US and acting on a pretext dismissed by American intelligence, the move appeared designed to bolster Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s electoral campaign.

Following the US-enforced lull on the Iran front, Benjamin Netanyahu is likely pursuing escalation across other arenas—including Syria, Lebanon, or Gaza—ahead of the Israeli election. Turkiye's primary challenge lies in avoiding Benjamin Netanyahu's bait while simultaneously preventing the normalization of such aggressive actions. Addressing this effectively would require direct intervention from US President Donald Trump to constrain Benjamin Netanyahu. A trilateral deconfliction mechanism can only succeed if the US lends genuine political weight to it. Even with such a framework, however, Syria has fundamentally changed how Turkiye and Israel perceive one another. Historically, Turkiye's core grievance with Israel centered on the Palestinian issue, rooting discontent in humanitarian, identity, and solidarity concerns. Today, Ankara perceives Israeli efforts to undermine the Syrian transition as a direct threat to its national security, viewing Israel less through the lens of the Palestinian question and more as a revisionist security challenge.

From the Eastern Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa and the broader Middle East, Turkiye and Israel maintain conflicting policies, priorities, and threat assessments. Despite these divisions, Syria functions as a microcosm for their competing visions of regional order. While Ankara favors a centralized, stable, and militarily capable neighbor to its south, Israel prefers a weak, fragmented Syria devoid of serious military strength. This vision places Israel at odds not just with Turkiye, but with the broader regional and international consensus. The US, the UK, Europe, and neighboring states have consistently backed a centralized and stable government in Damascus. Ironically, the only other regional actor favoring a weak or failed Syria appears to be Iran. If Israel insists that its security depends on keeping neighbors weak and fragmented, it risks generating perpetual wars and deep international isolation. Undermining the Syrian state ultimately paves the way for non-state actors and radicalism, threatening the entire region, including Israel—much like the instability in Lebanon historically fostered the rise of Hezbollah.

The divergent ideas of regional order held by Israel and Turkiye extend further into the post-Abrahamic Middle East. The recent Mecca Pact, uniting Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, is not inherently anti-Israel, yet it signifies a regional realignment that highlights the failure of the framework envisioned by the Abraham Accords and initiatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) or the I2U2 partnership between India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the US. The Abrahamic vision relied heavily on Arab-Israeli normalization under a US security umbrella, alongside the hard containment of Iran, the soft containment of Turkiye, and the sidelining of the Palestinian issue. Because this framework prioritized Israel's regional integration over the actual needs of Arab states, its aggressive and revisionist policies have instead deepened Israel's isolation, raised the costs of normalization, and fractured the Israeli-centric vision of order.

Israeli revisionism is not only alienating major regional states but also exposing a growing gap between Israel and the US regarding regional reordering. While Israel objects to the Mecca Pact, US President Donald Trump has welcomed it, recognizing its alignment with burden-sharing strategies and its broader regional legitimacy. This American stance suggests a recalibration of Washington's regional strategy, moving away from an unsustainable, Israeli-centric project that Washington had previously heavily invested in alongside Gulf states. Ultimately, no entity is more responsible for the demise of this vision than Israel itself.