Why Defeating the RSF Won't End Sudan's War, But Rather Fracture It

A group of armed defectors from the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) arrive in vehicles as they are believed to be surrendering to the Sudanese military, in the west of Omdurman, Sudan, on August 19, 2026 [AFP]. Sudan’s army has experienced a successful summer, with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) recapturing several towns along the strategic Export Road, known locally as Sadirat, and pushing the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into a defensive position across much of the central region.

Despite these military gains and growing confidence among SAF leaders regarding a total defeat of the RSF, the situation in Sudan's Blue Nile state tells a different story. In mid-August, the RSF and its ally, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (led by Abdulaziz al-Hilu), swiftly retook Kurmuk and seized Geisan. Concurrently, drone attacks on multiple army-controlled cities highlight that the RSF's operational reach extends well beyond its main territorial stronghold in Darfur.

These developments demonstrate that military victory and political resolution are increasingly diverging paths. Even a complete defeat of the RSF threatens to fracture the conflict into numerous smaller engagements, driven by the complex coalitions involved in the fighting. The anti-RSF coalition is spearheaded by the SAF, which relies heavily on allied armed movements such as Darfuri factions that signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), including Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim’s Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Darfur Governor Minni Minnawi.

Integration of these allied groups into the formal military has faced significant delays. Previously, Yasser al-Atta and Shams al-Din Kabbashi warned that semi-autonomous militias, tribal coalitions, and popular resistance groups backing the SAF could become future security threats if left unmonitored and unregulated. Meanwhile, the RSF coalition is experiencing internal fractures, marked by high-profile defections including al-Nour al-Qubba, al-Savanna, and Hamad Khalifa, the RSF-appointed governor for the Kordofan region.

Furthermore, figures like Abu Aqla Keikel illustrate the fluid and complex nature of loyalties within the conflict, as commanders maintain wide margins of operational independence. Sudan’s Islamists also occupy a notable position, with brigades such as al-Baraa ibn Malik, affiliated with Sudan’s Islamic Movement under the former ruling National Congress Party (NCP), playing instrumental roles in combat before enacting tactical withdrawals amid international pressure.

As General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan announces a national dialogue aimed at shaping post-war influence, the foundational challenges of dismantling or integrating remaining armed groups, securing Darfur, and bringing all allied militias under a unified chain of command remain pressing issues for Sudan's future.