Why Washington Shouldn't Let Iran-Backed Militias Dictate America's Exit from Iraq

On September 30, the last American and coalition troops are scheduled to leave Iraq, bringing an end to a military presence that began in 2003. Prime Minister Ali Al Zaidi calls the date "fixed and final," stating that October 1 will open a new chapter where Iraq exercises full sovereignty over its own soil. While stirring, this narrative collides with facts on the ground.

Mr Al Zaidi has tied two promises to this single date: the departure of the coalition and the surrender of all armed group weapons to state control. However, one of these deadlines is real while the other is mere theatre. This reality was underscored on August 17, when the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service force—the most capable and heavily US-mentored unit—detained Abbas Al Yaqoubi. Al Yaqoubi serves as the reconnaissance chief of Harakat Hezbollah Al Nujaba and an intelligence official in the Popular Mobilisation Forces, and was held on suspicion of involvement in drone strikes against neighbouring countries. Al Nujaba is an Iran-aligned Iraqi armed group established in 2013 and designated as a terrorist organisation by Washington in 2019, operating within the state-backed Popular Mobilisation Forces.

Al Yaqoubi’s detention lasted barely 24 hours. The governing Co-Ordination Framework denounced the arrest as a "kidnapping" and demanded he be handed over to the Popular Mobilisation Forces, after which a Baghdad court released him due to lack of evidence. This sequence demonstrates that Iraqi law enforcement operates only until it confronts armed actors.

While Mr Al Zaidi has successfully engaged some factions—with Asaib Ahl Al Haq, Kataib Al Imam Ali, and Muqtada Al Sadr’s Saraya Al Salam moving to surrender weapons symbolically—hardline groups have completely refused. Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid Al Shuhada, and Harakat Hezbollah Al Nujaba have vowed to keep their arsenals and continue attacks, including strikes on the Khor Mor gas field operated by Dana Gas and a barrage targeting Erbil.

A hard exit on September 30 risks dismantling the intelligence, air support, and logistics necessary to hunt ISIS remnants and defend Kurdistan's infrastructure. Rather than leaving on a timeline dictated by militias, Washington should condition its final drawdown on verified results, maintaining a lean advisory and counter-terrorism presence to help stabilize the region.