In a Multipolar World, Middle Powers Gain Choices While Losing Security Guarantees

Leaders gathered for a photo at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek on September 1, 2026. During the summit, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian received the political backing he sought. The SCO condemned military attacks against Iran, labeled them violations of international law and the UN Charter, reaffirmed Iranian sovereignty and territorial integrity, and advocated for political and diplomatic resolutions to the conflict. However, the organization stopped short of offering military defense for Iran.

This distinction between political solidarity and collective defense highlights crucial dynamics not only regarding Iran's experience with the SCO, but also concerning the broader international order. For years, discussions surrounding multipolarity implied that a China- and Russia-centered alternative bloc, bolstered by groups like BRICS and the SCO, would gradually challenge the US-led international system. Middle powers viewed participation in these institutions as a way to reduce their vulnerability to Western isolation and pressure.

Yet, the US-Israeli war on Iran demonstrated that these alternative relationships fail to deliver security guarantees comparable to formal military alliances. The lesson is not that multipolarity has failed middle powers, but rather that the emerging multipolar order functions differently than anticipated. Instead of replacing one alliance system with another, it fosters a dense network of overlapping partnerships that grant states diplomatic and economic flexibility without automatic security assurances.

For middle powers, this environment provides greater room for maneuver alongside diminished certainty regarding who will provide support during security crises. Turkiye exemplifies this shift. As a NATO member for over seven decades, Ankara remains tied to the Western security architecture, yet it frequently demonstrates that alliance membership does not demand automatic alignment with Washington. Turkiye has maintained ties with Russia despite the war in Ukraine, expanded its engagement with China, and participated in the SCO as a dialogue partner, all while navigating distinct differences with the US and Israel regarding the Middle East's regional order.

Ankara's strategy avoids a binary choice rather than abandoning NATO. Its NATO membership delivers security benefits the SCO cannot match, while relations with Russia, China, Iran, the Gulf states, and other regional players expand its diplomatic and economic options.

Brazil offers a similar model. Without formal military alliances tying it to the US, Brazil has historically navigated a US-dominated hemisphere where Washington expected political alignment. Its decision to stay out of the US-aligned Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition (ACCC), combined with its stances on the Iran war and other international crises, underscores its resistance to automatic strategic alignment based merely on regional proximity.

Simultaneously, Brazil maintains robust economic ties with China through BRICS while keeping important political and economic channels open with the US and Europe. Brasília aims to cooperate with both Beijing and Washington without depending entirely on either.

This flexibility represents a significant advantage of multipolarity for middle powers. The proliferation of global power centers diminishes the cost of defiance. States pressured by a dominant power no longer face a simple binary choice between compliance and isolation; instead, they can pursue alternative institutional partners without becoming full allies of rival powers.

India applies this logic as a core principle of its foreign policy, participating in the Quad alongside the US, Japan, and Australia while also belonging to BRICS and the SCO. At Bishkek, India supported the SCO declaration defending Iranian sovereignty while Prime Minister Narendra Modi emphasized to President Masoud Pezeshkian the necessity of maintaining freedom of navigation and commerce through the Strait of Hormuz.

Similarly, Gulf Cooperation Council members such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates maintain heavy security reliance on the US while broadening their economic and diplomatic engagements with China, India, and other Asian powers. Rather than replacing Washington with Beijing, these states seek concurrent partnerships with both.

Consequently, the primary impact of multipolarity for middle and smaller powers is not the availability of a new bloc to join, but the declining necessity of exclusive alignment with any single bloc. Nonetheless, this autonomy carries costs. Flexible arrangements that help states avoid choosing sides also yield fewer guarantees during existential crises. Neither BRICS nor the SCO, which operates as a non-military organization, features an equivalent to Article 5.

Ultimately, the emerging international system will not mirror a simple transition from a US-led order to a Chinese-led one, nor will it consist of a confrontation between two rigid blocs. Traditional alliances like NATO and various US security relationships remain indispensable across Europe, Asia, and the Gulf. Alongside them, however, a more fluid landscape of overlapping institutions and transactional relationships is taking shape, granting middle powers greater agency alongside heightened responsibility for their own security.