How the Iran Conflict Tested and Proved the Gulf's Multipolar Strategy

For several years, Gulf states have been widening the circle of their international partnerships. The logic was straightforward: keep the US as the principal security partner, while building deeper economic ties with China, India, Europe and the rest of Asia. The Iran war has meant that strategy needs a review.

When the crisis turned military, the US quickly returned to the centre of the regional security equation. Its military reach, intelligence capabilities, early-warning systems and naval and air presence were difficult to match. Whatever may have changed in the wider international order, no other outside power can yet provide the Gulf with the same combination of security capabilities. That, however, is only half the story.

The war did not reverse the economic changes that had already taken place. China remains central to Gulf energy and trade. India’s role is growing quickly. Europe still matters in investment, technology, defence and commerce. The region’s economic relationships are now far more dispersed than its security relationships. In a sense, the Gulf became economically multipolar before it became multipolar in security. That distinction matters because it explains much of the strategic tension facing the region today.

The issue is not whether Gulf states are moving from Washington to Beijing. They are not. Nor is there much evidence that they want to. The harder task is to maintain a close-security relationship with the US while expanding economic and technological relationships elsewhere, without allowing one set of ties to narrow the choices available in another.

The scale of the economic shift is already clear. China-GCC trade exceeded $288 billion in 2024. Trade between India and the Gulf states reached almost $179 billion in the 2024-2025 financial year. Europe, meanwhile, remains one of the region’s largest trading and investment partners. Energy points even more clearly eastwards. According to the US Energy Information Administration, 89 per cent of crude oil and natural-gas condensate passing through the Strait of Hormuz in the first half of last year was destined for Asian markets. For the Gulf, Asia is no longer simply one option among several. It has become fundamental to economic growth.

The result is an unusual strategic arrangement. Much of the region’s security still depends on Washington, while much of its future economic growth is tied increasingly to Asia. That arrangement is manageable in normal times, but war makes the contradictions much more visible.