Rising European Far Right Poses New Strategic Opportunities for Moscow

Russian President Vladimir Putin experienced a highly successful week, beginning with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, where he met with international leaders like Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi. Shortly after, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff arrived in Moscow to signal United States President Donald Trump’s continued determination to secure a deal on Ukraine with Putin. However, the developments in Europe provided the Kremlin with the most significant encouragement.

The electoral success of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Saxony-Anhalt raised the prospect of a Russia-friendly political faction governing a key European Union member state. For Putin, who maintains a background from his KGB days in Dresden, this outcome carries personal satisfaction. The AfD aims for potential federal power by the upcoming 2029 elections, fueled by public discontent with Chancellor Friedrich Merz, alongside promises to restrict immigration, limit LGBTQ rights, and reverse the transition to renewable energy.

The party's popularity remains particularly strong across former East Germany, following its success in the 2024 provincial elections in Thuringia. Nationally, the AfD polls ahead of the governing Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Unless the CDU manages an unexpected resurgence, populist hardliners could secure the largest caucus in the next Bundestag, potentially straining the established firewall (Brandmauer) designed to keep the AfD—which includes neo-Nazis—out of governance.

Russia may find common ground to facilitate such political partnerships, as the AfD seeks potential alliances on the left, such as the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), a splinter faction from the Die Linke party. Both political entities advocate for reducing military aid to Ukraine, pursuing peace negotiations with Russia, and lifting EU sanctions, while aligning on migration and gender issues that mirror Putin's critiques of Western cultural shifts.

Meanwhile, the political landscape in France presents another major challenge for European unity, as President Emmanuel Macron prepares to step down. Marine Le Pen of the National Rally (RN) is positioned as a strong contender in the 2027 presidential election. A nationalist and Eurosceptic victory in the Elysee would complicate efforts toward a unified European foreign policy concerning Russia, potentially freezing EU enlargement initiatives toward Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans.

While external commentators often attribute the surge of illiberal movements entirely to Russian interference, the core popularity of these groups stems from their ability to exploit genuine economic hardships and cultural anxieties. Moscow's influence campaigns primarily serve to amplify existing social divisions rather than manufacture them from the ground up, placing the ultimate responsibility on voters within democratic systems.

Political positions can evolve upon entering office, as demonstrated by Giorgia Meloni in Italy, whose Brothers of Italy became staunch supporters of Ukraine and Western unity after winning in 2022, and by the RN's shift toward the center under Le Pen and Jordan Bardella. The AfD, however, remains an exception by retaining its extreme stance. Ultimately, the populist surge across Europe may not steer nations in the exact direction Moscow desires, but it continues to disrupt internal EU cohesion and hinder its geopolitical ambitions.