How Israel's Targeted Assassinations Threaten the Possibility of Ending Regional Wars

Large crowds gather during a joint funeral held for Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Basij commander Major General Gholam Soleimani, and 84 sailors from the Iranian Navy frigate IRIS Dena, on March 18, 2026 in Tehran, Iran. [Majid Saeedi/Getty Images] In international politics, it is often assumed that wars end when the fighting becomes unbearable and the parties turn to diplomacy. However, diplomacy requires interlocutors—figures with the standing to negotiate and the authority to deliver. Remove them, and a war loses not only its potential mediators but the very possibility of a settlement.

This dynamic becomes evident following recent assessments. In early September 2026, Sir John Sawers, the former head of Britain’s foreign intelligence service, informed The Financial Times that Israel had deliberately killed Ali Larijani. In his view, Larijani was targeted not merely for running Iran’s war effort, but because he stood among the few Iranian figures capable of reaching an acceptable bilateral deal. Coming from a career intelligence officer, this observation raises a pressing question: does the elimination of Larijani fit a broader pattern where Israel removes key diplomatic figures during critical moments of potential negotiation?

Consider the actual outcomes of such targeted killings. Assassinating a government or military leader creates a vacuum that others rush to fill, but assassinating a designated negotiator creates a narrower and more damaging void: a vacuum of moderation. The successor to a slain negotiator is rarely more flexible; more often, they are harder, as hardliners are the ones who survive and inherit power. The diplomatic channel loses its author, and the subsequent hardening is interpreted on both sides as proof that diplomacy was never viable.

The precedent spans decades. In September 1948, Count Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations mediator for Palestine, was assassinated in Jerusalem by members of Lehi, a Zionist underground group whose leaders included future Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir. Bernadotte had been actively shuttling between parties with truce and partition proposals, while his killers viewed compromise as betrayal. This same logic reappeared in November 2020, when Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a leading figure in Iran’s nuclear programme, was killed near Tehran in an operation widely attributed to Israel. Occurring weeks after Joe Biden was elected U.S. president with a commitment to reviving the 2015 nuclear agreement, the timing suggested an obstacle deliberately placed in the path of diplomacy.

The killing of Ali Larijani in March 2026 follows this exact template. Having served as Iran’s nuclear negotiator two decades earlier and defended the 2015 deal as speaker of parliament, Larijani became Iran's effective decision-maker following the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the opening day of the war. Western diplomats described him as a tough yet pragmatic counterpart suitable for negotiating an American off-ramp.

This method is not restricted to state adversaries; Israel applies the same logic to non-state actors. In February 1992, Israel killed Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Abbas al-Musawi, whose successor Hassan Nasrallah built the movement into a formidable regional force over three decades. In July 2024, Israel assassinated Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’s political bureau and lead negotiator in Gaza ceasefire talks, while diplomacy was ongoing; authority then passed to Yahya Sinwar, and the negotiating track collapsed. Weeks later, Israel killed Nasrallah as well. In each instance, removing the point of coordination produced short-term disarray and, repeatedly, a successor less inclined toward a deal.

Viewed through Israel’s strategic lens, this approach remains coherent rather than merely vindictive. For a state viewing Iran’s system as an existential threat, the preferred outcome is systemic collapse rather than negotiated accommodation. A durable deal brokered by a credible pragmatist would stabilize the very order Israel seeks to dismantle, while foreclosing the American military pressure required to induce collapse.

Inside Iran, external pressure deepens internal division, widening the split between political leaders acknowledging war costs and a security establishment viewing every strike as validation of defiance. Removing pragmatists tilts the balance further toward the latter camp. While Israel's stated rationale remains military and preventive, aimed at decapitating hostile leadership, the strategy of foreclosing diplomacy carries uncertain returns, frequently generating a more implacable adversary.

Ultimately, eliminating politicians whose trajectories threaten Israel has become a priority alongside conventional warfare. However, military superiority has not compelled Tehran to surrender. Instead, a secondary objective has emerged: manufacturing internal political chaos to drive the Iranian system toward complete collapse. As key figures capable of closing deals are systematically removed, a critical question remains: who is left to make peace, and does a strategy that empties the negotiating table eventually run out of anyone able to end the war?