Strategic Imperatives: How Jordan Can Navigate Israel’s Escalation in the West Bank

Palestinians attacked by Israeli settlers and soldiers while picking olives run for cover in the village of Beita, south of Nablus, in the occupied West Bank on October 2, 2026 [AFP]. It is increasingly difficult to regard what is happening in the West Bank as merely a series of measures that the Israeli government justifies on security grounds or as part of counterterrorism operations. Taken together, the cumulative pattern and expanding scope of these measures point to a broader political and territorial trajectory: one aimed at reshaping the West Bank, imposing new facts on the ground, entrenching Israeli control, and advancing the de facto annexation of large parts of the territory while simultaneously subjecting Palestinians to mounting pressure that, directly or indirectly, pushes them from their land.

Israeli, journalistic, and research reports have documented the intensification of this trajectory through settlement expansion, land confiscation, restrictions on Palestinian movement, control over water resources and grazing areas, as well as military operations and repeated internal displacement in several parts of the West Bank. Considered individually, each of these measures may appear to be a separate issue. Viewed together, however, they reveal a more consequential development: an effort to re-engineer the geography and demography of the West Bank in ways that undermine the prospect of establishing a contiguous and viable Palestinian state. The question, therefore, is no longer simply what is happening in the West Bank. The more urgent question is how can Jordan, the Palestinians, the Arab world, and the international community prevent this trajectory from becoming a permanent reality.

The Jordan Valley at the heart of the equation

The Jordan Valley assumes exceptional importance in this context, not only because of its geographical and security significance, but also because of its agricultural and economic importance and its water resources for the Palestinian people. Reports concerning the construction of a new Israeli barrier, referred to as the “Crimson Thread”, extending roughly 480km (300 miles) from the Golan Heights to the Red Sea, warrant serious Jordanian, Arab, and international scrutiny, particularly if such a project is intended to isolate the Jordan Valley and place as much as 83 percent of its total area under Israeli control.

Such a development could in effect sever the West Bank from Jordan and deprive Palestinians of one of their most important agricultural and water resources. Borders, walls, roads, and settlements cease to be merely physical infrastructure when they are combined with control over land and water. They become instruments for reshaping political and demographic geography and weakening the ability of Palestinians to remain on their land. This is precisely where the Palestinian issue intersects directly with Jordan’s national security.

Jordan faces a different phase

Jordan cannot treat developments in the West Bank as an exclusively Palestinian matter. At its core, this is an issue of Jordanian national security, regional stability, and the future of the Palestinian cause. Any fundamental change to the geographical or demographic reality of the West Bank will inevitably carry direct consequences for Jordan because of geography, history, and proximity. And if the eventual outcome is forced displacement, then, as King Abdullah II has repeatedly made clear, such a scenario would amount to a declaration of war on Jordan.

The policy required of Jordan at this stage, therefore, must be proactive: one that anticipates possible scenarios and prepares for them politically, diplomatically, economically, and in security terms.

First: Protect Jordanian national unity

Jordan’s first line of defence is its national unity. At this stage, it is essential to strengthen the concepts of citizenship and the state, consolidate full equality among Jordanians, and reject any discourse or practice that creates divisions on the basis of origin, region, or roots. The Palestinian cause must remain a national, Arab, and humanitarian cause. It must not be allowed to become a source of division within Jordanian society.

Responsibility falls on both the state and society to confront hate speech and incitement, apply the law equally and fairly, and protect the national fabric from attempts to exploit regional turmoil to sow division among Jordanians. One of the gravest outcomes Jordan must prevent is the transfer of the conflict into its own domestic sphere. Relations among Jordanians of different origins, including those of Jordanian and Palestinian heritage, must never become a vulnerable fault line through which those seeking discord, whether from within the country or from abroad, can operate. National unity, therefore, is not merely a social value. It is an integral component of Jordan’s national security architecture.

Second: Move from diplomacy of protest to diplomacy of pressure and proportionate action

Jordan has accumulated considerable international credibility and diplomatic capital. The present phase, however, requires Jordan to expand the tools at its disposal. It is no longer sufficient simply to condemn settlement activity, reject annexation, or warn against displacement. What is needed is an Arab, Islamic, and international diplomatic front capable of translating political positions into practical measures. In coordination with Palestine and Arab and Islamic states, Jordan should work to mobilise countries that reject annexation and settlement expansion, support international legal action, push for concrete measures and sanctions not only against settlements but also against state policies that enable them, systematically document violations, use political and economic relations strategically, and build an international coalition capable of preventing irreversible facts imposed by force.

A comparison with Russia’s war in Ukraine is instructive. When Russia occupied large areas of Ukrainian territory, sanctions were not confined to the territories under occupation; they were imposed on Russia itself. The question, therefore, is why a different standard should apply elsewhere. The international community does not lack resolutions or statements. What it lacks is the conversion of political will into a tangible cost for those who violate international law.

Third: Establish an Arab and Islamic fund for Palestinian resilience

If the objective is to prevent displacement and enable Palestinians to remain on their land, financial support must become a sustained strategic policy rather than seasonal assistance tied to moments of crisis. One option would be to establish an Arab, Islamic, and international fund dedicated to strengthening Palestinian resilience with a mandate to finance specific projects in the West Bank and Gaza, including protecting land threatened with confiscation, supporting farmers, developing water resources, assisting affected families, financing housing, supporting education and health services, aiding municipalities, and providing alternative sources of income.

Resilience is not merely a political slogan. It is a material reality. Every Palestinian family who remains on its land, every farmer who continues to cultivate his fields, and every village that retains access to its water resources represents part of the effort to prevent displacement.

Fourth: Treat the Jordan Valley as a Jordanian national security issue

Jordan should address developments in the Jordan Valley as a permanent strategic file. A specialised Jordanian mechanism should be established to monitor settlement expansion, land confiscation, infrastructure construction, demographic changes, water control, and population movements. These developments should be documented through maps, satellite imagery, statistics, and official records so Jordan maintains a comprehensive dossier that can be used politically and legally before the international community.

Fifth: Strengthen Jordan’s national defence architecture

Strengthening Jordan’s ability to protect its security, borders, and national interests is not optional. Jordan is a country with limited resources, but it possesses significant human and institutional expertise. It can further develop an advanced national defence, civil protection, and crisis-management architecture, including national service programmes, civil defence preparedness, critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, border security, and emergency management, while drawing on the experience of retired military personnel.

Sixth: Prevent Jordan from becoming an “alternative homeland”

This issue must remain at the centre of Jordanian strategic calculations. Any project that directly or indirectly leads to the depopulation of the West Bank or pushes large numbers of Palestinians towards Jordan is not merely a humanitarian question; it would carry profound political, security, and demographic consequences for the kingdom. Jordan’s position must remain unequivocal: resolving the Palestinian question cannot come at Jordan’s expense, displacement is not a political solution, and Jordan is not an alternative homeland for the Palestinian people.