Sudan's Path to Peace: Why Dialogue, Not Dismissal, is Crucial

More than three years into the devastating war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan is in urgent need of a political settlement. The ongoing conflict has inflicted immense suffering, and a purely military solution is insufficient to rebuild the nation or reunite its fractured society. Consequently, any initiative aimed at fostering Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue warrants serious consideration rather than outright rejection.

In August, a committee of 19 prominent Sudanese public figures, led by Ahfad University President Qasim Badri, launched an initiative to lay the groundwork for national dialogue within Sudan. Earlier, its members had met with SAF chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and advocated for the removal of legal restrictions on opposition politicians. In response, the authorities issued a decree to drop certain politically motivated charges against Sudanese individuals abroad who were returning for dialogue and to grant participants temporary legal protections. While limited, these are significant confidence-building measures.

However, the initiative has encountered substantial opposition. The civilian coalition Sumoud, headed by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and Ta’sis, an alliance that includes the RSF, have voiced their opposition to the proposed internal dialogue. They question the initiative's independence and express concern that holding talks in areas controlled by the army could legitimize al-Burhan’s authority and further entrench the country’s divisions. These are valid concerns that deserve careful attention.

The committee, however, states its objective is not to negotiate Sudan’s future or set the agenda for a national dialogue, but rather to help create an environment where Sudanese political actors can engage directly. The critical question is whether it can achieve this role without allowing one side of the conflict to dominate the process. Dismissing the initiative prematurely, before it has had a chance to prove its worth, would be ill-advised.

Sudan's political actors and civil society organizations remain deeply divided, previous mediation attempts have failed, and the ongoing war increasingly complicates comprehensive political engagement. The committee’s initiative represents an effort to break this deadlock. Preparations for political dialogue should not be deferred until the fighting ceases. While securing a ceasefire and ensuring humanitarian access are urgent priorities, the groundwork for political dialogue can and should proceed concurrently.

The committee members were not elected and do not represent all political constituencies. Nevertheless, the initiative’s legitimacy should not be judged solely on its formation but on its ability to bring a wider range of political actors into a national dialogue. Good intentions alone are insufficient to address credibility concerns; for political dialogue to succeed, participants must believe the process is fair and independent. The legitimacy required to facilitate a political opening may differ from that needed to negotiate a national settlement, but even a preparatory initiative must earn the trust of those it aims to bring together.

The committee’s meeting with al-Burhan was a practical necessity, given his position as army chief and head of the Sovereignty Council, which enabled him to act on the committee’s requests for legal protections. Engaging with al-Burhan does not inherently signify endorsement of his authority. However, if the initiative becomes too closely aligned with the army, other political actors might perceive it as an extension of al-Burhan’s political agenda rather than an independent facilitator. Therefore, the committee must demonstrate that its engagement extends beyond military authorities and that it is willing to collaborate with opposing political forces.

The initiative’s launch in Khartoum, an area under army control, raises a legitimate concern about whether a process originating in territory controlled by one warring party can garner the confidence of political forces across the nation. A national dialogue must transcend geographical and political boundaries. Regions have experienced diverse realities of war, governance, displacement, and insecurity. The committee must devise strategies to reach individuals outside army-controlled areas, including those displaced by the conflict, and ensure their unhindered and intimidation-free participation.

While the decision by Sumoud and Ta’sis to reject the initiative does not automatically invalidate the process, their concerns warrant consideration. However, outright rejection at this nascent stage risks forfeiting an opportunity for political engagement. Simultaneously, their absence is significant; Sudan’s crisis is too profound and complex to be addressed by any single political faction. The committee cannot expect immediate endorsement from all stakeholders but must foster conditions that encourage reluctant actors to participate. Failure to do so would signify the initiative's failure.

The African Union Commission and the Arab League have welcomed the initiative, offering valuable regional support. Their endorsement strengthens efforts to revive Sudanese-led political dialogue, though external backing cannot replace the confidence of Sudan’s own political forces. Consequently, the committee’s initiative should be assessed with balanced perspective, avoiding excessive optimism or automatic suspicion. The legal measures announced following the engagement with al-Burhan are an encouraging initial step, but the true test lies ahead: Will these measures practically remove legal and political obstacles for opposition actors? Can the initiative gain the trust of those who have rejected it? Can it ensure free participation for Sudanese individuals across political and geographical divides?

What remains clear is that Sudan’s crisis will ultimately necessitate a political engagement among Sudanese actors with fundamentally divergent visions for the country’s future. No committee or external actor can achieve this on their behalf. At best, a preparatory initiative can help create the conditions for such engagement to become possible. The concerns raised by critics should not be disregarded, but they should not serve as grounds for rejecting the initiative before it has had a chance to address them. Those who have rejected it should remain open to reconsidering their stance if the committee demonstrates its capacity to build an independent and inclusive process. Success in this endeavor would represent a significant national service.