Ukraine and Europe Navigate Rocky Relations with Trump: A Strategic Imperative

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's attendance at an EU leaders summit in Brussels on October 16, 2026, underscored the critical need to bolster support from European allies amidst strained relations with US President Donald Trump. Zelenskyy expressed his dismay, stating, “It’s painful when President [Donald] Trump chooses one side, not our side.” A significant point of contention has been the much-discussed diesel deal between the United States president and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, which has further exacerbated tensions between Washington, Ukraine, and its European supporters. The reported disruption of Starlink/Starshield services on October 13-14, which caught Ukraine’s military off guard, added to these strains. Although service was later restored, unconfirmed reports suggested the restrictions were imposed at the White House's behest to pressure Kyiv. These incidents have collectively amplified the perception of a growing divide between Ukraine and the US. On Friday, Zelensky accused Washington of continuing to impede Starlink and of offering new concessions to Russia. While it is prudent to await further developments, Trump has previously shown a leaning towards Moscow, notably during his August 2025 summit with Putin in Anchorage, Alaska, before re-establishing conditional support for Ukraine in the face of Russian intransigence and diplomatic efforts by Kyiv and European leaders. The current arrangement, where Europe finances US weapons supplied to Ukraine, remains functional, and the US continues to share intelligence with Kyiv, despite some reports of withheld critical information. Furthermore, the White House has retreated from proposals to formally recognize Crimea as Russian territory, as suggested in its April 2025 peace framework, or to demand Kyiv's withdrawal from the entire Donbas region. Ukraine and Europe, in turn, have continued to engage with Trump’s diplomatic overtures to Moscow, spearheaded by his envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.

The diesel deal itself may face eventual collapse due to bipartisan opposition in Congress, including from Republican senators, potentially diminishing the significance of Washington's recent shift towards Moscow. However, this does not warrant complacency from Ukraine or its European partners, who face numerous concerns beyond Trump's unpredictability, particularly Putin's determination to escalate the conflict. Ukrainian cities and infrastructure are subjected to daily attacks by ballistic missiles and advanced jet-propelled drones, while air defenses struggle, and the nation braces for another challenging winter. A parallel propaganda war, amplified by the diesel deal, is underway. Russia, unlike Ukraine, did not initially embrace Trump’s proposal for a partial ceasefire on strikes against energy facilities but is now portraying Kyiv as the obstructionist following renewed Ukrainian attacks, including an assault on a refinery in Ryazan on Thursday, which Trump condemned as “a disgrace.” The conflict has extended to NATO's eastern flank, with ships carrying Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea being targeted in Romanian waters. Russia is intensifying its hybrid attacks across Europe to disrupt arms and ammunition supplies to Ukraine and to influence public opinion in key nations like Germany by fostering fear. Some factions within the European Union are advocating for renewed engagement with Moscow. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico confirmed the resumption of work by the Slovak-Russian intergovernmental economic commission, while his Bulgarian counterpart, Rumen Radev, commended Trump’s diesel diplomacy, even as Russian drones struck near Bulgaria’s Black Sea coast.

Financing Ukraine presents another significant challenge for European nations. The 90-billion-euro ($101 billion) loan authorized by the EU in April may be depleted well before the end of 2027. Estimates suggest Kyiv will require an additional 70 billion euros ($79 billion) for defense and civilian needs in 2027, potentially creating a contentious issue for EU member states already engaged in budget negotiations for the 2028-2034 period. Amid calls for substantial spending cuts, the controversial prospect of utilizing frozen Russian financial assets in Europe to fund aid for Ukraine is resurfacing, especially as Trump advocates for the release of some of these funds. This debate precedes several crucial elections, including the French presidential elections in April and May, and polls in Spain, Italy, and Poland.

Given the prevailing instability in Europe, the sustained diplomatic and financial support for Ukraine is noteworthy. European Council President Antonio Costa, alongside Zelenskyy and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Brussels, stated on Friday, “This is no time to withdraw the support to Ukraine. This is no time to relieve Russia’s sanctions.” Zelenskyy emphasized the stakes, reminding attendees, “If we fall, 20 million Ukrainians will come to Europe. Stay strong, defend our country.” In the lead-up to the summit, the EU initiated two clusters of accession talks with Ukraine and implemented a new round of sanctions against Russia. Zelenskyy's visit to Brussels followed discussions with British Prime Minister Andy Burnham and King Charles III in London on Wednesday. However, the capacity of the EU and the United Kingdom to provide further assistance beyond their current commitments is limited. They have effectively assumed the role of Ukraine's primary international champions and de facto guarantors of its statehood, replacing the US. Membership in the EU, or at least a close partnership akin to Norway's, represents the most favorable long-term outcome for Kyiv. Concurrently, Europe lacks the immediate political and military capacity to fully substitute for the US on the battlefield. While top European intelligence agencies may provide some data, no EU alternative to Starlink exists. Europe cannot supply sufficient air defense systems and interceptors to counter Russian attacks without US backing. In response to US unreliability, Europe is investing in these capabilities to achieve strategic autonomy, but even optimistic projections indicate these efforts will take a decade to yield results. Crucially, Europeans possess limited leverage to compel Putin towards negotiations. While potential incentives like sanctions relief and the resumption of oil and gas flows exist, any Russian response would likely necessitate some form of pressure. The US has thus far failed to exert significant pressure on Putin, and under Trump, has shifted from punitive measures to offering incentives, including a mix of diplomatic and business “deals.” This failure stems partly from the fear of escalation with a nuclear power and partly from the current US administration's opportunistic approach. Ultimately, there is little indication that Europe can achieve a better outcome independently.

Consequently, both Zelenskyy and European leaders are likely to revert to their established strategy: attempting to maintain Trump's favor and minimize their differences. They are likely hoping the current White House overtures to Russia will subside after the midterm elections. They will also likely argue to Trump that upholding a firm stance against Moscow aligns with his legacy and enjoys support among his Republican peers. The overarching strategy appears to be one of endurance: waiting out the winter and then the remainder of the Trump presidency.