The Deep-Seated Psychological Complexes Hindering Iran-US Negotiations

Since the commencement of hostilities, numerous negotiation initiatives have been attempted between the United States and Iran. Only one, the memorandum of understanding signed in Islamabad on June 18, concluded but dissolved within days. Prevailing analyses often attribute this failure to the specifics of the agreements, but this article posits a different explanation: the diplomatic impasse is driven by a long-standing syndrome that has characterized US-Iranian relations for years. In international relations, psychological syndromes can emerge from profound crises that leave lasting impressions on political consciousness and memory, thereby impeding rapprochement and negotiation efforts between nations. For Iran and the US, this syndrome comprises two distinct complexes: one developed by Washington following the 1979 US embassy siege in Tehran, and another by Tehran stemming from historical US hostility and its 2018 withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal.

The roots of the estrangement between the two nations trace back to August 1953, when US and British intelligence agencies orchestrated the overthrow of the nationalist government of Mohammad Mosaddegh after his nationalization of the oil industry in 1951. Since then, a persistent perception has taken hold in Iranian consciousness: that Washington is unwilling to accept an independent government in Tehran and is prepared to undermine it if it conflicts with US interests. From this viewpoint, Washington's decision to host Shah Reza Pahlavi, recently deposed by his people, for medical treatment in October 1979 was interpreted by revolutionary Tehran as a precursor to a second coup.

On November 4 of that year, Iranian students stormed the US embassy, holding 52 Americans captive for 444 days. Diplomatic ties between the two countries were severed and remain so to this day. While this event is framed in the Iranian narrative as a defense of the revolution, in the American consciousness, it cemented the image of Iran as a state that disregards international norms, whose commitments are unreliable, and whose behavior should not be rewarded. This constitutes the embassy siege complex. Its significance lies less in the incident itself and more in the informal rule it established for US decision-making: Iran must concede first, and its concessions must be verified before it receives any reciprocation.

The Iranian complex was also shaped by this history, but it reached its zenith in May 2018 when US President Donald Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), despite the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) confirmation of Tehran's compliance. Merely two weeks later, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo outlined 12 demands for a new agreement, with only four pertaining to the nuclear issue. Seven demands addressed Iran’s regional activities in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan, and the Gulf. Consequently, Washington not only rescinded an existing accord but also escalated its conditions for any future deal. The situation further complicated in June 2025 when the US participated in the Twelve-Day War, targeting nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan during a period when a new round of indirect negotiations was scheduled in Muscat. The situation reached its most critical point with Washington's involvement, alongside Israel, in the ongoing conflict.

As a result, a conviction has become deeply ingrained in Iranian consciousness: an American signature guarantees nothing, any agreement can be overturned by a change in administration, and negotiation itself might serve as a pretext for war rather than a genuine alternative. The informal rule derived from this experience in Iranian decision-making is that no step will be taken without binding guarantees, and no concession will be made before pressure is alleviated. Thus, the two complexes stand in direct opposition: the first necessitates Iranian action before an American quid pro quo, while the second demands an American guarantee before Iranian action.

Examining recent negotiation initiatives reveals that every US proposal bears the mark of the embassy siege complex. The 15-point plan presented in March called for the dismantling of the Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow facilities, an end to uranium enrichment, the suspension of Iran’s missile program, and the abandonment of its allies in exchange for future promises to lift sanctions. The May draft by White House envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner linked the release of Iran’s frozen assets to the prior suspension of enrichment. The American response in September also mandated the freezing of enrichment and the entry of inspectors throughout the negotiation period. What remains consistent in American initiatives is the principle of Iranian action preceding the quid pro quo and verification preceding trust.

The imprint of the JCPOA withdrawal complex is also evident in Iranian initiatives. The five-point response in late March demanded assurances against future conflict. The 10 points put forward in April requested a binding UN Security Council resolution to safeguard any agreement from being revoked. The 14 points in May demanded a non-aggression pledge that included Israel. Meanwhile, the seven-day plan proposed by Tehran last month stipulated the lifting of sanctions and the US naval blockade on Iran before the opening of the Strait of Hormuz on the sixth day and the commencement of nuclear negotiations on the seventh. What remains constant in Iranian initiatives is the principle of guarantees preceding action and the lifting of pressure preceding Iranian concessions.

All these initiatives have been dialogues between two complexes, with each side formulating its terms to protect itself from a recurrence of its historical experience with the other, rather than seeking common ground. This may explain why the substantive gap has narrowed, but the trust deficit has not. The Islamabad memorandum stands as an exception that proves the rule, representing the closest moment to a settlement because it was designed to address the core concerns of both parties. To reassure Washington, it included the dilution of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile and made the lifting of sanctions and unfreezing of assets conditional on Iranian implementation. To reassure Tehran, it provided for an end to hostilities, respect for mutual sovereignty, a mechanism for monitoring implementation, and UN Security Council approval of the final agreement. Ballistic missiles were also entirely omitted from the text.

However, this agreement did not hold. Tehran suspended its participation in the Geneva round of talks due to the absence of a ceasefire in Lebanon, a consistent demand in every Iranian initiative since March. In the Iranian interpretation, Washington's inability to restrain Israel confirmed that an American signature was insufficient. The JCPOA withdrawal complex was immediately reactivated, returning the two sides to their starting point. By late September, the dispute appeared to have definitively shifted from substance to sequencing. Informed sources indicated that it now centers on the order of steps rather than their content, with the stated objective being a return to an enhanced version of the June memorandum. Here, the two complexes are most clearly manifested: Washington insists on the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and the freezing of enrichment first, stemming from its distrust of Iran, while Tehran demands the lifting of the naval blockade first, due to its distrust of the US.

A comparison between Pompeo’s 2018 conditions and the June 2026 memorandum reveals that US demands have shifted from redefining Iran’s regional role to focusing on the nuclear file and the Strait of Hormuz. Conversely, Iranian demands have evolved from seeking compensation from Washington to proposing a conditional investment fund financed by other parties. In essence, the substantive gap between the two sides has significantly narrowed—a development that would have been inconceivable eight years ago. However, the two complexes have not diminished; they may have even intensified due to the war. Each complex fuels the other, collectively forming a single syndrome, transforming the diplomatic deadlock from a temporary condition into a stable structure. Consequently, any new formula for sequencing steps, regardless of its precision, will be unable to break this deadlock unless it addresses both complexes simultaneously—a task requiring a third party capable of guaranteeing both the action and the reciprocal action concurrently.