Iran's Alleged Support for Houthis Fuels Yemen Conflict and Saudi Attacks

New allegations regarding Iranian support for Yemen’s Houthis have surfaced in media reports and official statements, shedding light on the secretive nature of their alliance. Media outlets have indicated that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) provided assistance to the Houthis during their capture of significant areas in western Yemen and their most sophisticated attacks to date on Saudi Arabia, which backs the Yemeni government recognized internationally in its fight against the Houthis.

Reported Iranian assistance to the Houthis includes training, intelligence sharing, tactical guidance, and support for drone and missile targeting. Such backing, if confirmed, would intensify tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, particularly as the kingdom has faced numerous Houthi drone and missile strikes in recent weeks, including an attack on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh that resulted in 13 fatalities. The group has also targeted Saudi energy facilities and oil tankers.

According to reports, Iranian backing played a role in a September offensive by the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah. These battles led to the Houthis gaining control of Yemen’s Red Sea coastline and the strategically vital Bab al-Mandeb strait. The Wall Street Journal reported that Iranian Mahan Air flights transported IRGC paramilitary officers, drone components, missile guidance systems, and impact detonators to the Houthis in Yemen, with IRGC officers reportedly present on the front lines directing Houthi operations.

Major-General Turki al-Maliki, spokesperson for the Saudi-led coalition supporting Yemen’s government, acknowledged the involvement of an external state actor behind the Houthis’ advanced weaponry but did not name the country. Al-Maliki stated that the Houthis, engaged in conflict since 2014, have acquired advanced technologies with regional backing, making them the first non-state armed group to deploy ballistic missiles, offensive and suicide drones, and high-speed explosive-laden boats, weaponry also possessed by other Iranian allies like Hezbollah and Iranian militias.

While the Houthis maintain their independence from Iran, the two entities share ideological alignment and are accused of close military collaboration, evidenced by the Houthis’ missile capabilities. Analysts speaking to Al Jazeera generally agreed that the “regional assistance” points to the IRGC, despite denials from Iran and the Houthis. One piece of evidence cited is the bombing of Sanaa International Airport in July, just before an Iranian plane carrying a Houthi delegation from Tehran was scheduled to land. The Yemeni government, which claimed responsibility for the attack, accused the Iranian aircraft of violating Yemeni airspace.

Ibrahim Jalal, an analyst focused on Yemen, told Al Jazeera that recent reports corroborate long-standing expert knowledge of the Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah’s involvement in operational planning against the Yemeni government and neighboring countries like Saudi Arabia. He cited the death of Hassan Irloo, the Revolutionary Guard envoy to the Houthis in Yemen, after the 2021 military campaign on Marib, and Mahan aviation flights transporting experts before escalations in July as significant indicators.

Ali al-Dahab, an expert in military and strategic security affairs, concurred that the Houthis’ advanced weaponry suggests an Iranian role in recent operations. He noted that leaked information about Iranian support confirmed existing knowledge, with the added detail that weapons smuggling, particularly precision technologies for missiles and drones, may involve small submarines. Al-Dahab mentioned that while smugglers historically used dhows to evade naval coalitions, the use of submarines is a new tactic by the Houthis, similar to methods used by organized criminal groups.

Al-Dahab indicated that Iran views the Houthis as a crucial military and security asset in the Red Sea, supplying them with weapons, expertise, and intelligence in anticipation of potential conflict in the Strait of Hormuz, with the Houthis playing a supporting role in the Bab al-Mandeb strait. He warned of increased risks to international shipping with the Houthis controlling Bab al-Mandeb, a critical waterway connecting the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Al-Dahab cautioned about the potential for sub-state entities in the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to unite under Iranian leadership against Western powers if a conflict erupts in the region.

Saudi Arabia and Iran had previously appeared to mend years of animosity, including the severing of diplomatic ties, through a reconciliation agreement brokered by China in 2023. However, Hesham Alghannam, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Riyadh, expressed skepticism about the sincerity of the reconciliation, viewing the Beijing agreement more as a de-escalation tactic. Geopolitical differences, including on Yemen, persist between the two nations. Alghannam suggested that the agreement was a way to manage disagreements rather than resolve them, and it remains functional until openly challenged.

Alghannam questioned whether Tehran's agreements translate to control over its aligned armed groups like the Houthis. He recalled the 2014 scenario where the Houthis were offered political concessions in Yemen in exchange for relinquishing heavy weapons, but instead seized the capital, Sanaa, leading to the government's displacement and the eventual killing of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Alghannam described how the Houthis consolidated power by embedding supervisors in official posts, bypassing state structures, and noted that Saudi Arabia’s red line is the existence of an armed group operating as a second army within a state.

The Saudi-led intervention in Yemen began in March 2015, escalating the conflict between Riyadh and the Houthis. Despite significant support for the internationally recognized government, Saudi Arabia failed to recapture Sanaa, exposing weaknesses within the anti-Houthi coalition, including divisions between the government and southern separatists. Alghannam concluded that the lesson from 2015 was not that firm action leads to prolonged war, but that premature announcement of goals can create binding commitments before delivery is possible. He emphasized that Riyadh's current challenge is to link financial and military aid to genuine integration under a single command, rather than mere declarations of loyalty.

Hassan Ahmadian, an assistant professor of political science at the University of Tehran, explained that Iran aims to foster technological independence among its partners rather than perpetual dependence. He contrasted this with the US approach, which often requires allies to purchase weapons, while Iran shares technology for local production, a strategy observed in Yemen and Gaza. Ahmadian stated that empowering allies to produce their own weaponry is a strategic move for Tehran, motivated also by the Houthis' desire to break the Saudi blockade on territories they control.

Ahmadian believes that this technological transfer serves to confront a common enemy, making the independent strengthening of these capabilities a strategic interest for Iran. He highlighted the Houthis' motivation, linked to the perceived justice of their cause and the severe siege impacting a large portion of the Yemeni population under their control. Ahmadian noted that the regional context provides the Houthis with a motive to pressure Saudi Arabia to lift the siege, a strategy that has indeed unfolded.