Pakistan Army Chief's Tehran Visit: A Diplomatic Push Amidst US-Iran Tensions


This story, titled "Pakistan army chief in Tehran: Can diplomacy prevent new US-Iran fighting?" First published on Al Jazeera English and was retrieved from its original source on October 20, 2026.
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Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan's army chief, arrived in Tehran on Tuesday evening for crucial talks with Iranian officials. This visit is part of escalating diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing a new conflict between Iran and the United States and Israel. Munir's trip marks his fifth to Iran since the April ceasefire, which was brokered by Islamabad between Tehran and Washington. Pakistan's Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi is accompanying Munir, according to Iran's state news agency IRNA. The Pakistani army chief is scheduled to meet with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, IRNA reported.
The visit follows closely on the heels of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's talks in Tehran and comes two weeks after Pakistan and its allies agreed to accelerate the deployment of forces to Saudi Arabia, which has faced repeated attacks from the Iran-backed Houthi armed group in Yemen. Lavrov's visit on Monday was his first to Tehran since the US-Israel war on Iran began in February. During his meetings with Araghchi and President Masoud Pezeshkian, discussions focused on the war, the Strait of Hormuz, and efforts to achieve a ceasefire.
Seyed Mojtaba Jalazadeh, a foreign policy analyst based in Tehran, commented that the timing of Munir's visit, immediately after Lavrov's, suggests Iran's preference for maintaining multiple diplomatic channels rather than relying on a single mediator. However, this visit also occurs amidst warnings from some experts about growing indications that United States President Donald Trump might be preparing to re-engage in hostilities with Iran. Trump had previously rejected an Iranian proposal to end the war on September 26. Since then, the US has deployed an additional aircraft carrier to the Middle East, expected to arrive by late November. Trump has also publicly endorsed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel's upcoming October 27 election, framing their shared objective as attacking Iran, and stated that the US would act alone if Netanyahu were not re-elected.
Analysts suggest these developments underscore the urgency of diplomatic initiatives to avert potential military escalation. In recent weeks, Qatar has played a significant role in facilitating communications between the US and Iran. Andreas Krieg, an associate professor in security studies at King's College London, noted that while Qatar provides much of the diplomatic infrastructure, Doha values Islamabad's established access to both Washington and Tehran. Krieg explained that Pakistan offers political access, particularly through Field Marshal Asim Munir, while Qatar handles the detailed negotiations.
Pakistan has been instrumental in mediating between Washington and Tehran since February 28, when the US and Israel commenced strikes against Iran. Islamabad successfully brokered a ceasefire on April 8 and subsequently hosted high-level direct engagement between the US and Iran. In June, the two nations agreed to a 14-point memorandum of understanding (MoU). This agreement stipulated the lifting of the US naval blockade within 30 days, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and the phased release of approximately $24 billion in frozen Iranian assets over 60 days of further talks, which included negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. This period concluded in mid-August without an extension.
Iran contends that the US failed to uphold its commitments, leading Tehran to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed and insist on the lifting of the blockade. Pakistan's Foreign Office has consistently highlighted the significance of the agreement. Spokesman Sajjad Haider Khan stated on October 9 that several points under current discussion align with the Islamabad MoU. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar mentioned on October 2 that Iran's seven-day plan was derived from the MoU. However, experts are divided on whether the agreement can still serve as a basis for negotiations. Umer Karim, an associate fellow at the King Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, believes a new mechanism might be necessary, while Krieg described the MoU as "politically alive" but "operationally dead" due to changed circumstances. Muhammad Faisal, a South Asia security researcher at the University of Technology Sydney, maintains that the MoU remains usable as the minimum agreed benchmark between Washington and Tehran, offering a framework for addressing maritime access, sanctions relief, and nuclear talks.
Meanwhile, Pakistan has deepened its defence ties with Saudi Arabia, signing the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement on August 7, following a previous Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement in September 2025. An emergency meeting in Riyadh on October 5 led to an agreement to expedite force deployment under this pact. Subsequently, Houthi missiles and drones targeted Riyadh's King Khalid International Airport and other locations. Lieutenant-General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, the Pakistani military's spokesman, emphasized the importance of protecting holy sites in Mecca and Medina, stating that Pakistan would provide necessary support. He indicated that if a negotiated outcome fails, the collective deterrence of the Mecca Alliance would be activated.
When questioned about Pakistani forces in Saudi Arabia engaging the Houthis, Foreign Office spokesman Khan clarified that they would not cross the border into Yemen. Prior to his Tehran trip, Munir met with the Saudi ambassador to Pakistan, Rajeh Tami Albugamy, with both expressing satisfaction with the pact's progress. Tehran's public response to the defence agreement has been measured. On October 11, Araghchi informed his Saudi counterpart that Iran was ready to assist in dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, though Saudi state media reported discussions focused solely on regional violence escalation.
Krieg observed that Pakistan's role as an intermediary is becoming more complex due to its security commitments to Saudi Arabia, potentially compromising its perceived neutrality. Jalazadeh suggested that while Iran does not view stronger Pakistan-Saudi defence cooperation as an immediate threat, it complicates its strategic calculus.
Washington is also sending mixed signals. President Donald Trump pledged not to strike Iran before the US midterm elections on November 3rd, citing productive discussions. However, the naval blockade remains in place. Days later, Trump endorsed Netanyahu, implying US military action if Netanyahu were not re-elected. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's unannounced visit to Israel amid discussions about resuming combat operations against Iran further fueled these concerns. Analysts suggest that threats of military strikes, coupled with the blockade and indirect negotiations, erode Iran's confidence in Washington's intentions, making security guarantees a central issue. The proximity of the US midterm elections and Israel's election creates pressure for both sides, increasing the risk of escalation, particularly if Iran overplays its hand or if a major attack results in American casualties.
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