Operation Gospel: How a Soldier's Desperate Need for Cash Led to the Sale of Top Secret UK and US Plans for Lebanon

On March 16, 1965, at lunchtime, Chief Inspector Jock Wilson of London’s Special Branch observed Peter Sydney Allen, a soldier and desk sergeant at the Ministry of Defence, exchanging envelopes with another man near Charing Cross Underground station. Allen had been under surveillance for a month. His companion, Maj Abdul Hafidh Khazal Al Abbassi, an assistant military attaché from the Iraqi embassy, was also apprehended. Maj Al Abbassi claimed diplomatic immunity and was released shortly after his official car arrived. Allen, however, was taken to New Scotland Yard and charged with selling state secrets to Egyptian and Iraqi agents. Over a dozen meetings in a month, Allen handed over Top Secret UK and US plans intended to aid Lebanon against an attack, alongside files on "Assistance for Kuwait," "Family of Weapons," and an index of accessible War Office files. He was subsequently sentenced to 10 years in prison.

The operation, codenamed Gospel, was revealed through newly released documents from the UK’s National Archives, many pertaining to the Cold War. The Allen file highlighted a surprisingly lax security approach at the Ministry of Defence, relying heavily on trust and vetting, which proved insufficient. Security services, monitoring the Egyptian embassy in Mayfair, became aware of clandestine meetings with a British official matching Allen’s description. Allen initiated contact with the Iraqi embassy via a War Office payphone, driven by a pressing need for money due to his wife's cancer surgery and mounting bills.

His initial exchange, for which he received £20, involved papers concerning Kuwait and was made at the embassy in Queen’s Gate, South Kensington. A note found on him detailed a contact who would determine payment based on the secrets' value. This contact later inquired about papers related to Middle Eastern countries. Allen then provided a Top Secret paper concerning Lebanon, intended for a meeting near Charing Cross, but was told it was of no value. He was advised to approach Egyptian embassy agents instead, with the promise of payment if he could provide information, particularly on Israel.

The Top Secret Lebanon plans detailed a joint UK and US strategy for military assistance to the Lebanese government in response to aggression or to maintain order. The plan identified Syria and Israel as potential external threats but considered direct aggression unlikely. The primary concern was internal religious strife, potentially exacerbated by Syria and Egypt through propaganda and agents. The action plan outlined a phased response, including air and naval surveillance, followed by an amphibious assault if necessary, with forces on standby from Cyprus.

Allen, who had served in Egypt in the 1950s, admitted to about a dozen meetings, often receiving £15, with contacts near Park Lane and Curzon Street in Mayfair, or near Charing Cross. He was responsible for the custody and processing of all Top Secret documents at his office, with access to two locked cabinets. He stated his motivation was solely financial distress, with all proceeds going to his wife for household expenses. He maintained he never revealed his identity or workplace to the agents and would not have supplied information to Soviet bloc countries.

Discussions among British authorities regarding the agents Allen met concluded that demanding their removal was unnecessary. However, the agents were observed leaving the UK after their compromise. Home Secretary Frank Soskice was reportedly impressed by the case details. Chief Inspector Wilson received commendation from Courtenay Young, a senior MI5 officer, for the swift resolution of Operation Gospel within a month and a day, attributing it to efficient cooperation.

Mark Dunton, a principal records specialist at the National Archives and co-author of "The MI5 Archive: Official Secrets," noted the Allen case's parallels to the Portland Spy Ring, highlighting a continued public fascination with espionage. He pointed out that despite internal security posters, the Ministry of Defence relied on civil service values, which proved fallible, leading to the capture of individuals like Allen when colleagues became suspicious.