Netanyahu Vows Iran Regime Change as Primary Goal: Can Israel Achieve It?

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared that overthrowing Iran’s government remains Israel’s “primary objective,” a statement made as he faces declining poll numbers ahead of national elections. These remarks followed discussions with United States President Donald Trump and a visit from Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth. However, Netanyahu provided no indication that Washington has committed to joining another offensive against Iran, let alone a campaign aimed at toppling its leadership.

While Israel possesses the military capability to inflict significant damage on Iran, analysts suggest it lacks a clear strategy to translate military successes into regime change. Air strikes alone are deemed insufficient, and a ground invasion would necessitate a far greater military commitment. Furthermore, any renewed offensive would involve confronting a state that has already endured two rounds of attacks and retains the capacity for retaliation against both Israel and its Gulf neighbours hosting US military assets.

US backing remains uncertain, with experts questioning Washington's willingness to engage in further conflict, especially given the absence of a credible prospect for forcing Iran's government to capitulate to its demands.

Does Israel possess the necessary firepower?

Experts acknowledge Israel's ability to attack Iran is not in question. Urban Coningham, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), highlighted Israel's substantial advantage due to its offensive weapons stockpiles and aerial refueling capabilities. "Israel could again establish air superiority and strike Iranian targets," he stated.

Despite Israel's capacity for inflicting serious damage, analysts are skeptical about its ability to achieve regime change. Netanyahu has consistently identified Iran's leaders as a major threat since his first term as prime minister in 1996. His address to the US Congress in July 1996 characterized Iran as, "The most dangerous of these regimes is Iran, that has wed a cruel despotism to a fanatic militancy." The US involvement in the June 2025 war and the campaign launched on February 28 of this year represented the military intervention Netanyahu had long advocated for, yet the overthrow of Iran’s government did not materialize.

Netanyahu himself acknowledged the limitations of airpower in March, stating, “You can’t do it only from the air.” He added, “There has to be a ground component, as well,” without elaborating on the specifics. Caglar Kurc, an assistant professor at Abdullah Gul University in Kayseri, Turkiye, explained that bombing might weaken Iran’s military but not necessarily its ability to retaliate. “Airpower can degrade military capabilities but cannot fully destroy offensive capabilities,” he told Al Jazeera. “Well-hidden systems would survive.” Kurc emphasized that regime change would require deploying troops and maintaining a presence on the ground for years. Israel can no longer rely on covert methods proving as effective as in past attacks. Coningham described intelligence assets as “use and burn,” as their deployment risks exposing networks that Iranian security services could disrupt. While Israel retains “human intelligence assets on the ground” and can employ “cyberattacks,” using these capabilities carries the risk of exposure and sacrifice, making tangible military gain a crucial consideration. Covert operations and cyberattacks, in his assessment, do not offer a clear path to overthrowing Iran’s government. Coningham also expressed skepticism regarding the potential of Kurdish or Baloch armed groups to provide the necessary ground force. Reports from CNN in March indicated the Trump administration was discussing providing arms to opposition Kurdish groups, according to Kurdish and US officials, but this did not progress. “Kurdish groups lacked the military capabilities to take on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),” Coningham noted.

Iran retains the capacity to retaliate

Experts believe Iran does not need to match Israel's air-to-air capabilities to make another offensive extremely costly. Sidharth Kaushal, a senior research fellow at RUSI, indicated that "Iranians likely retain sizeable stocks of missiles," despite potential damage to targeting systems. "The actual antiship missile stockpiles likely remain large, both because they are comparatively easy to make, and Iran has in-housed much of the production of older Chinese ASCMs, and Iran’s southern mountains provide natural shelters against air attack," Kaushal explained.

Coningham pointed out that Israel's ability to sustain its defenses would be more challenging, with previous exchanges having depleted interceptor stocks. Repeated attacks also impose a financial burden, as Israel would be using costly defensive weapons to intercept relatively inexpensive Iranian drones. This imbalance could strain Israel’s interceptor supplies over a prolonged conflict, while Iran can continue to mass-produce cheaper weapons for a longer duration.

Would Washington join another attack?

Analysts consider this scenario unlikely, citing divergent political interests between Tel Aviv and Washington, particularly with Trump facing pressure to avoid further escalation before the US midterm elections. The Financial Times reported this week that an Israeli proposal for renewed strikes did not receive Trump’s approval, though it suggested disagreement over immediate action rather than a complete rejection of future attacks. Without US participation, Coningham stated, Israel would lack crucial US capabilities for striking deeply buried facilities, such as the 30,000-pound GBU-57 bunker-busting bombs used by US B-2 bombers on Iran’s Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities in June 2025. These weapons provide Washington with an offensive capability Israel cannot replicate independently.

Coningham also suggested that if Israel were to attack without US support, Iran might focus its retaliation on Israeli territory, avoiding US targets and disruption to the Strait of Hormuz. Such a strategy would aim to punish Israel without directly involving Washington, potentially further isolating a country already facing international criticism for its actions in Gaza. However, analysts identify the primary obstacle to an Israeli attack on Iran as the disparity between its capacity to destroy military targets and its ability to effect political change within Iran. “You cannot change a regime unless you are prepared to deploy troops and stay in the country for some years. Israel cannot control Iran. The United States would not engage in another regime change, which could take decades,” Kurc concluded.