Putin Courts Africa Amidst War in Ukraine; African Leaders Pursue Independent Agendas

As Russia's protracted war in Ukraine continues, President Vladimir Putin is actively seeking allies and expanding his nation's global influence. Concurrently, African governments are forging their own paths, engaging with the Kremlin for distinct strategic advantages. During the third Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow, President Putin positioned Russia as a superior partner for Africa compared to Western nations. He asserted that the West exploits the continent's resources, employs a colonialist approach, and uses debt to impede development. Putin proposed Russia's alternative model of cooperation, emphasizing mutual prosperity through enhanced trade and technological collaboration. "Our business does not engage in the predatory, neo-colonial exploitation of natural and human resources," Putin stated, highlighting that Russian companies contribute to local job creation and tax revenues.

The summit saw participation from delegations representing 48 of Africa's 54 nations, with 22 countries sending heads of state, an increase from previous years. This high-level attendance aids Moscow in counteracting its increasing international isolation due to Western sanctions. Will Brown, an Africa policy specialist at the European Council on Foreign Relations, suggests that the visual impact of Putin alongside African leaders, which can be amplified by Russian influence networks to shape perceptions globally, might be more significant than the summit's specific agreements. "The ‘story’ of the summit is the most important thing," Brown commented.

However, African governments are not merely choosing sides between Moscow and the West. Tighisti Amare, director of the Africa Program at Chatham House, describes their strategy as "diversified non-alignment," maintaining relationships with multiple partners rather than aligning with a single bloc. These decisions are driven by varied needs, including security assistance, agricultural supplies, energy investments, or diplomatic support. Brown also notes that many governments leverage international competition to secure more favorable terms from Western partners.

Russia has notably increased its presence in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, where military-led governments have turned to Moscow for security support after severing ties with Western partners. Russia's military engagement has expanded through the Africa Corps, a paramilitary organization that has taken over many of Wagner's operations following the mercenary group's 2023 mutiny. The Sahel region is a particular focus for the Africa Corps, which reportedly has a presence in Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic (CAR), Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Mali, and Niger. Russian military instructors have also been reported in the Republic of Congo, Madagascar, and Togo, though claims regarding Togo are contested. Moscow is also pursuing a naval base on the Red Sea through a proposed facility in Sudan. The transition from Wagner to Africa Corps signifies a shift, with the new force operating under Russia's Defense Ministry and military intelligence, often comprising former Wagner fighters but focusing more on training and securing strategic sites.

While Russia's political and security engagement in Africa is significant, its economic footprint is smaller. Russia-Africa trade was projected at $27 billion in 2025, falling short of Moscow's 2019 target of $40 billion, with a new goal set at over $50 billion. This figure is considerably lower than trade volumes with China (approximately $348 billion in 2025) and the European Union (approximately $395 billion in 2025).

Agriculture represents a stronger area of commercial ties, with Russia exporting substantial agricultural products and fertilizers to Africa. Energy cooperation is also underway, including Russia's state nuclear company, Rosatom, building Egypt’s El Dabaa nuclear power plant. Putin also promoted digital cooperation and local production of medicines and vaccines at the summit, though Amare points out that realizing these initiatives requires significant investment and infrastructure.

Ethiopia exemplifies Russia's continued military offerings, with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announcing the acquisition of Russian Su-35 fighter jets and S-400 air-defense systems. This deal, despite Western sanctions on Russia, highlights Moscow's capability to supply advanced weaponry, though it could raise concerns for Egypt given regional tensions. Russia's overall arms exports have seen a decline in recent years, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Closer military ties also present risks. Amnesty International has documented alleged cases of Africans being recruited into the Russian military through deceptive or coercive means, with circumstances in many instances amounting to trafficking. CNN has interviewed African individuals who reported being misled or forced into Russian military service. Russia denies unlawful recruitment, stating that foreign nationals can voluntarily enlist.

The summit concluded with a joint declaration, an agreement on civilian artificial intelligence, and a Russia-Africa action plan for 2027–2029. The African Union Commission and Russia also signed a cooperation plan covering various sectors. Amare emphasizes that the success of these commitments hinges on funding, clear responsibilities, and defined timelines. Brown observes that African governments are adeptly navigating a complex international landscape, leveraging competition to enhance their positions and secure better terms from all partners. "They also see the increasingly nasty world we live in and the cards they have to play," he stated, suggesting that while Putin courts Africa, many governments are "playing their hand very skillfully."