Iran's Power Dynamics: Who Dictates Terms in US Negotiations Amidst Escalating Threats?

Amidst ongoing negotiations aimed at averting further conflict between Iran and the United States, the internal power structures within Iran's government are becoming increasingly apparent. President Masoud Pezeshkian, identified as a relative moderate, announced on Monday that he had received specific authorities from Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei to conduct these crucial talks with the US. Pezeshkian, who has faced opposition from hardliners wary of any agreement with Washington, did not elaborate on the scope of this granted authority. This development follows mediation efforts by countries like Qatar and Pakistan, attempting to de-escalate tensions and prevent further US strikes on Iran.

The situation has intensified following significant US and Israeli air strikes on Iran on February 28, which resulted in the deaths of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other high-ranking Iranian officials. Since these events, the influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders and other security-focused officials within Iran has grown considerably. Sina Toossi, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, noted that any agreement would require the endorsement of Iran's security and military establishment, particularly as negotiations now encompass not only the nuclear program and sanctions but also broader security arrangements, including control over the Strait of Hormuz and assurances against future attacks.

Iran has presented a seven-point proposal that it insists the US must adhere to for the cessation of hostilities and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials maintain that decisions regarding the war and negotiations are made through a collaborative approach involving key governmental institutions, including the office of the supreme leader and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Military and security figures play a significant role in these bodies. Mojtaba Khamenei's office confirmed meetings with top military commanders, such as IRGC chief commander Ahmad Vahidi, to issue directives concerning US threats of all-out war. Khamenei emphasized that Iran's armed forces are to respond swiftly and without geographical limitations to any threat, expanding the list of potential US and Israeli targets should the conflict escalate.

While ultimate decisions on ending the war rest with the supreme leader, the SNSC, comprising representatives from the armed forces, government ministers, and heads of parliament and the judiciary, must first vote on such matters. Legally, the Iranian president heads the SNSC. However, the secretary of the SNSC has recently gained prominence due to their role in coordinating national security affairs. This position has been held since early August by Mohsen Rezaei, a former IRGC commander-in-chief with no prior public office experience. When US Vice President JD Vance sent a letter to Tehran, it was addressed to Rezaei, bypassing the president and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran's parliament speaker, who has also served as the chief negotiator. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman, Esmaeil Baghaei, indicated that Rezaei, not Ghalibaf, would respond to the letter if he chose, while also clarifying that Ghalibaf's role as chief negotiator remained unchanged.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and his deputies, including Kazem Gharibabadi, continue to be key government figures engaged with mediators and pursuing diplomatic channels through the United Nations and international bodies. Ghalibaf had previously led talks that resulted in a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Washington in June, which temporarily halted the war and lifted a US naval blockade on southern Iranian ports. However, this agreement collapsed after Tehran accused the US of breaching its terms, particularly concerning the Strait of Hormuz, leading the IRGC to attack three vessels attempting unauthorized passage. The US military responded with escalated strikes, reinstated the blockade, and imposed new sanctions. Subsequent explosions affected several ships in the Strait of Hormuz, with Iran's military suspected of involvement.

The failure of the MoU fueled discussions about Iran's internal power dynamics. For months, speculation circulated among media and analysts regarding who authorized the attacks and their consequences. Some US media outlets cited sources suggesting hardline factions within the establishment were responsible. In early August, Pezeshkian expressed a preference for the MoU's continuation, stating a dedicated team should have addressed violations rather than resorting to conflict. IRGC spokesman Hossein Mohebbi later confirmed in mid-October that the attacks on the three ships were not rogue actions and had received coordination from unspecified higher authorities, emphasizing that military hierarchy would not be bypassed on such critical matters.

Mohebbi characterized the attacks as a