UAE and Saudi Arabia's Shifting Stances Amidst Renewed Tigray Conflict

As renewed fighting in Ethiopia’s Tigray region escalates, threatening the stability of the Horn of Africa, the public support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for Ethiopia’s federal government and Saudi Arabia’s history of regional diplomacy are under increased scrutiny. Both Gulf powers hold significant strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, though their roles diverge. The UAE has openly backed Ethiopia’s government, while Saudi Arabia has previously facilitated a rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea and was reportedly offered to mediate between the two nations in 2025. The current hostilities risk undermining the November 2022 Pretoria peace agreement, which concluded the war between Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigrayan forces. With escalating tensions involving Eritrea, the positions of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh offer insight into the interests of external actors in the ongoing crisis.

The UAE: Clear Alignment, Unproven Leverage

On September 25, the UAE issued a condemnation of attacks by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its allied armed groups against Ethiopian federal forces, the seizure of airports in Tigray, and the escalation in the neighboring Afar and Amhara regions. Sheikh Shakhboot bin Nahyan Al Nahyan, the UAE minister of state, expressed solidarity with Ethiopia’s government and people, reiterated support for the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and called for an end to hostilities, the protection of civilians, and adherence to the Pretoria Agreement.

This statement clearly articulated Abu Dhabi’s public stance: support for Ethiopia’s federal government coupled with a call for de-escalation and dialogue. However, it did not clarify whether the UAE is providing military assistance or has secured commitments from the involved parties to cease hostilities. The UAE also possesses commercial interests throughout the Horn of Africa. Dubai Ports World (DP World) manages the Berbera port in Somaliland, and a shipping route established in 2025 connects this port with Jebel Ali in the UAE, providing an additional cargo corridor to inland destinations like Ethiopia. Ethiopia, landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, relies heavily on Djibouti for its international trade access. These commercial ties help explain Abu Dhabi’s vested interest in regional stability and its relationship with Addis Ababa. Nevertheless, these factors do not confirm the UAE’s ability to influence the TPLF, persuade Eritrea to de-escalate, or alter Ethiopia’s military strategies. The extent to which Abu Dhabi can leverage its relationship with the federal government to foster a political resolution to the conflict remains uncertain.

Saudi Arabia: Diplomatic Experience, Uncertain Engagement

Saudi Arabia has yet to issue a public statement regarding the recent fighting in Tigray. According to an October 1 analysis by Critical Threats, the kingdom has not publicly commented on the renewed war, despite undertaking diplomatic efforts earlier in the year to reduce tensions between Ethiopia’s federal government and the TPLF. Saudi Arabia has a history of attempting to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In November 2025, Chatham House reported that sources indicated Riyadh had offered to mediate between the two nations amidst rising tensions concerning maritime access and regional security. A June 2026 analysis by Germany’s SWP think tank noted that previous Saudi mediation efforts had been unsuccessful, partly due to negotiations not addressing Ethiopia’s interest in the Eritrean port of Assab.

The kingdom’s broader regional alignment is also a significant factor. An August 2026 analysis by the Soufan Center described Saudi Arabia and Egypt as supporting Eritrea in opposition to Ethiopia’s aspirations for Red Sea access. This assessment pertains to regional alignment rather than direct evidence of Saudi Arabia providing military support to Eritrea or the TPLF in the current conflict. Saudi Arabia has a strong interest in Red Sea security, a critical route for international shipping and its own oil exports. It remains unclear whether Riyadh will adopt a more public diplomatic role as tensions intensify.

Egypt’s Rivalry with Ethiopia Adds to Regional Tensions

Egypt’s involvement in the crisis is influenced by its long-standing dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and its strengthening ties with Eritrea. Cairo has also emphasized that the governance and security of the Red Sea fall under the responsibility of the bordering countries, a position shared by Asmara. This issue has exacerbated regional tensions as Ethiopia seeks secure access to the sea. In September, Ethiopia’s army chief, Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, accused Egypt and Sudan of backing armed groups fighting the federal government, including the TPLF. His remarks, reported by Al Jazeera on September 28, lacked substantiating evidence. Egypt’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Nader Zaki, subsequently reaffirmed Cairo’s commitment to state sovereignty and non-interference, refuting claims of deviating from these principles, though he did not directly address the specific allegation of Egyptian support for the TPLF. Nonetheless, Egypt’s relationship with Eritrea has become a crucial element of the regional landscape. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi met with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in Cairo on June 8, 2026. According to Egypt’s presidency, their discussions covered bilateral cooperation, developments in the Horn of Africa, and Red Sea security. Both leaders also stressed the importance of coordination for maintaining regional stability. This meeting highlighted closer cooperation between Cairo and Asmara but did not confirm either country's involvement in the renewed Tigray fighting. For Cairo, the dispute with Ethiopia extends beyond Tigray to the Nile River and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa. Its relations with Eritrea and disagreements with Addis Ababa are part of the broader regional context, but they do not indicate direct Egyptian involvement in the renewed conflict. It remains uncertain whether these regional relationships will impact the course of the fighting.

From Tigray to a Wider Regional Crisis

The risks extend beyond Tigray. Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access has become a point of contention with Eritrea, which controls the port of Assab on the Red Sea coast. Addis Ababa asserts that reliable sea access is a national priority, while Asmara rejects any infringement on its sovereignty. Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of deploying troops across the border and supporting armed groups, allegations that Eritrea denies and has called upon the United Nations Security Council to investigate. These claims remain contested, but the deteriorating relations heighten the stakes of the renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia. A broader confrontation could endanger more civilians, impede humanitarian access, and disrupt regional trade and security. It would also test the capacity of external partners to foster restraint without appearing to endorse either side’s military objectives. The UAE’s close ties with Addis Ababa could serve as a channel for diplomatic engagement, while Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic track record presents a potential avenue for renewed talks. However, current public evidence does not indicate that either country is leading an initiative to contain the crisis.

Influence Must Be Measured by Outcomes

The UAE and Saudi Arabia should not be perceived as pursuing opposing strategies merely because one has publicly supported Ethiopia’s federal government while the other’s current position is less visible. Their interests and diplomatic approaches differ, but the evidence does not suggest either possesses decisive influence over the fighting. Their contributions should be evaluated based on their ability to facilitate concrete steps toward de-escalation, renewed political dialogue, and reduced tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Public statements, commercial interests, and past diplomatic achievements may create opportunities for engagement, but they are not substitutes for tangible progress on the ground. The Pretoria Agreement remains the framework for a political settlement in Tigray, yet the renewed fighting underscores the difficulty of sustaining peace while underlying disputes persist. A lasting settlement will ultimately depend on the parties involved. External partners could contribute by encouraging restraint and supporting credible negotiations. For now, the UAE’s clear alignment with Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic history offer distinct potential channels for engagement. Whether either country can translate these relationships into a meaningful contribution toward de-escalation remains unresolved.