Malaysia's Diplomatic Gambit: Welcoming Myanmar's Leader Undermines Justice and Refugee Protections

On October 8, 2026, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim hosted Myanmar’s President Min Aung Hlaing in Putrajaya, complete with a guard of honour and an official luncheon. This marked the military chief’s first visit since the 2021 coup. Coincidentally, nine days prior, Malaysia had repatriated 1,476 Myanmar nationals by sea, initiating a plan to return 5,000 individuals. While Kuala Lumpur frames this as pragmatic diplomacy, critics argue it lends credibility to a retreat from international accountability, weakening essential legal frameworks for smaller nations.

The domestic landscape in Malaysia has seen a rise in online hate speech and misinformation targeting the Rohingya, the country's largest refugee community, since May. By late July, at least nine Rohingya community schools faced closure orders, and over 100 Rohingya reported being driven out of their Penang village by residents. This hostility disregards facts, as Malaysia’s police chief notes that Rohingya constitute only 0.02 percent of crime. Research by INITIATE.MY and the Center for the Study of Organized Hate has identified AI-generated content amplifying anti-Rohingya disinformation across Malaysia, Indonesia, India, and Bangladesh, portraying refugees as a threat and justifying vigilante violence. Electoral considerations also play a role; with heavy losses in three state elections and a general election anticipated by February 2028, Anwar’s coalition might perceive a firm stance on Rohingya returns as a demonstration of control, although voter disillusionment and right-wing opposition cast doubt on potential electoral gains.

Malaysia is not isolated in its actions. In 2024, Mongolia hosted Vladimir Putin despite an ICC arrest warrant, and Hungary welcomed Benjamin Netanyahu in 2025 under similar circumstances. Kuala Lumpur denies this constitutes recognition, yet Anwar has stated Malaysia’s intention to work towards Myanmar’s full reintegration into ASEAN, with Min Aung Hlaing seeking a seat at the bloc’s November summit in Manila. Each such reception normalizes the next, signaling to leaders accused of atrocities, including Netanyahu and Min Aung Hlaing, that diplomatic rehabilitation is achievable without facing justice.

ASEAN's past attempts at engagement with Myanmar have proven ineffective. In April 2021, Min Aung Hlaing agreed to the Five-Point Consensus but subsequently ignored it, allowing violence to persist, preventing the ASEAN special envoy from meeting Aung San Suu Kyi, and failing to initiate inclusive dialogue. The bloc’s primary leverage was the exclusion of military leaders from its summits. Myanmar Specialist Arkar Hein commented that welcoming Min Aung Hlaing without demands rewards defiance and suggests that time and staged elections can substitute for compromise. He added that such international receptions reduce the regime's willingness to offer concessions to opponents, reinforcing the belief that only armed conflict will determine Myanmar’s future.

Malaysia has cultivated a reputation as a regional peacemaker over decades, a standing now jeopardized by its recent actions. The country has been instrumental in the Bangsamoro peace process since 2001 and facilitated talks in southern Thailand since 2013. In November 2024, Anwar expressed support for the ICC’s arrest warrants against Netanyahu and his former defense minister, stating they “should be arrested even if they are visiting other countries.” That same month, the ICC prosecutor sought an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing for alleged crimes against humanity against the Rohingya, with an Argentinian court subsequently issuing its own warrant. The Gambia’s genocide case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice specifically addresses the 2016-17 operations commanded by Min Aung Hlaing, which resulted in thousands of deaths, mass rapes, and the destruction of villages, leading to over 700,000 Rohingya fleeing to Bangladesh. UN investigators have called for him to face genocide charges. While Malaysia is not a signatory to the Rome Statute and thus not legally obligated to arrest him, its credibility as a peacemaker and its stance on Palestine hinge on consistent application of standards.

The returns of Myanmar nationals are proceeding based on assurances that cannot be independently verified. UNHCR has stated it was not involved in the returns and could not confirm their voluntary nature or the existence of safe conditions. Reports indicate that children were among those returned. Despite not being a party to the Refugee Convention, Malaysia is bound by the customary principle of non-refoulement, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Myanmar has warned of significant risks. Naypyidaw claims no Rohingya are involved, as it does not recognize them as citizens. However, other returnees face risks of arbitrary detention, prosecution, and forced recruitment. The military does not maintain control over Rakhine State, where the Arakan Army occupies over 90 percent of the territory. On September 28, shortly before the returns began, a military airstrike reportedly killed at least 50 civilians in Rakhine State, adding to numerous mass killings by the military earlier in the year. Furthermore, the military-backed government is incapable of ensuring the safe return required, as evidenced by the absence of voting in 67 townships during its election and the refusal of the National Unity Government (NUG) and major ethnic armed groups to engage in peace talks when offered in April. Without a ceasefire and an inclusive political process, assurances of safe return are hollow.

Malaysia’s frustration is understandable, given its decades-long hosting of refugees with limited international support and the decline in resettlement opportunities since the Trump administration suspended US refugee admissions in January 2025. However, inadequate burden-sharing does not justify returns without safeguards. The ICC’s purpose is to provide justice for victims of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity when their own states fail them, a mission now under considerable pressure. On October 9, the day after former ICC judge Navi Pillay received the Nobel Peace Prize, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on the court itself. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Venezuela have announced their withdrawal. However, middle powers can resist these pressures. Seventy-nine ICC member states, including Canada, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa, supported the court following the initial US sanctions in February 2025, and Hungary’s new government reversed its predecessor’s withdrawal in May. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines has extradited former President Rodrigo Duterte to The Hague, where judges found him fit to stand trial for crimes against humanity, with proceedings scheduled to commence on November 30.

Middle powers such as Malaysia, alongside blocs like ASEAN and the European Union, cannot prevent US sanctions but can choose not to follow the Trump administration’s lead. As Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney stated at the World Economic Forum in January, middle powers “must act together, because if we’re not at the table, we’re on the menu.” Malaysia and its regional partners should lead by rejecting efforts to undermine the ICC, refusing to treat Min Aung Hlaing’s presidency as a clean slate, and opposing Rohingya returns into active conflict zones. Malaysia should support efforts to hold him accountable if ICC judges issue a warrant and reconsider its 2019 decision to abandon accession to the Rome Statute. This stance does not preclude engagement; Kuala Lumpur should condition Myanmar’s reintegration into ASEAN on tangible progress regarding the Five-Point Consensus, beginning with an end to violence and the initiation of inclusive dialogue involving the NUG and ethnic armed organisations. Domestically, Malaysia should halt returns until an independent body verifies their safety and voluntariness, and hold accountable those who threaten or attack refugees. Malaysia should not bear this responsibility alone. ASEAN partners, members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and donor countries should provide funding for refugee registration, education, integration, and resettlement. Governments must also hold tech platforms accountable for amplifying anti-refugee disinformation and demand swift action against incitement. For years, Malaysia has provided refuge to the Rohingya and others fleeing Myanmar when few nations would. This history grants it the standing and the responsibility to defend the international justice system it has long advocated for.