Israel's Election: Beyond the Polls, A Shift in Policy or Just New Faces?

Billboards featuring Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud party and former Israeli military chief Gadi Eisenkot, leader of the Yashar party, were seen at the entrance to Kiryat Malachi, Israel, on October 20, 2026 [Amir Cohen/Reuters]. In Israel’s complex political landscape, with a general election looming that is widely considered one of the most critical in the nation's history, the common sentiment is that the current coalition and opposition parties are in a close race. However, this perception doesn't tell the whole story. Most polls indicate that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, along with his far-right and ultra-Orthodox allies, will not achieve a parliamentary majority. Furthermore, most opposition parties have stated they will not form a coalition government with parties representing Israel’s Palestinian citizens, often called the “Arab parties,” until the final election results are known. This stance could also hinder the opposition's ability to secure the necessary support to govern. If the opinion polls accurately reflect Tuesday's outcome and the opposition manages to overcome the challenge of forming a governing majority, a new government might be established, potentially led by retired Lieutenant General Gadi Eisenkot, a former Israeli military chief of staff from the center-right. The core question, however, extends beyond whether the Israeli electorate will change the government's personnel; it is about whether new leadership will also usher in policy changes on the most pressing issues facing the country, and by extension, the Palestinians and the broader region. My assessment is affirmative, but with significant caveats. After nearly two decades in power over the last thirty years, including the past four years leading what many consider Israel's most far-right and ineffective government, Netanyahu may leave behind a nation deeply wounded. His persistent pursuit of power has eroded national cohesion, intensifying fear and a pervasive sense of siege within Israeli society. Throughout his tenure, Netanyahu has cynically exploited and manipulated this deep-seated insecurity. The devastating Hamas-led attacks on October 7 exacerbated these fears, further pushing Israeli politics to the right. While most opposition parties are themselves center-right or right-wing, they differ significantly from the current governing coalition. Notably, Netanyahu's decisions on critical national security issues have been compromised by the extraordinary circumstances of his ongoing trial in three corruption cases, facing charges of fraud, breach of trust, and bribery. Consequently, he was willing to legitimize and empower the messianic far-right, making its representatives politically viable, and then to form a coalition with them. Other politicians were reluctant to serve under a prime minister facing such charges, especially alongside these extreme national-chauvinistic parties. Eisenkot and Benny Gantz did join an emergency government led by Netanyahu after the October 7 attacks but departed when they realized he was yielding to the far-right. A new prime minister, free from these personal legal entanglements, would possess greater autonomy to govern without the primary objective of clinging to power at any cost to evade accountability in his corruption cases. It is highly probable that a different Israeli government three years ago would have managed the war in Gaza differently and agreed to a ceasefire much sooner, leading to the release of hostages and saving thousands of innocent Palestinian lives. A government not including Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich would also be more inclined to cooperate with United States President Donald Trump’s peace plan and the Board of Peace. In the short term, this could lead to improved humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip and potentially pave the way for some Israeli withdrawal, although an immediate and complete withdrawal remains improbable. The government that might emerge from the opposition parties, while not ideal, could function as a government of containment—similar to the fictional “little Dutch boy” plugging a dike to prevent a flood. Such a government would likely not hesitate to halt and reverse the so-called judicial overhaul, which represented an attack on the separation of powers, checks and balances, and essentially, the democratic system itself. A Netanyahu-Ben-Gvir government risks rendering Israel a democracy in name only, with severe repercussions for its domestic affairs, increased oppression in the occupied Palestinian territory, and strained foreign relations. For instance, a government distinct from the current one would be less likely to consider proposals, voiced from the coalition benches, to abolish the Jewish Division of the Shin Bet, Israel’s internal security and counterintelligence service. Without this division, settler violence, often described as terrorism, would likely escalate further and continue with near impunity. A new government would also be more inclined to base appointments to senior civil service positions on merit rather than political alignment or personal loyalty to the prime minister, a common practice under the current administration. Moreover, the opposition parties are expected to fulfill their commitment to take decisive action against attacks on innocent Palestinians. These attacks have intensified during the olive harvest, making a swift and sustained response increasingly urgent. Another area where such a government could effect change is the approved E1 settlement project, for which construction tenders have already been issued. Whether driven by ideology, strategic concerns, or a desire to de-escalate tensions with the international community, suspending or canceling the project could be a crucial initial step toward curbing settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank. It is reasonable to assume that a new government might adopt an approach that relies less exclusively on military force in Lebanon and Syria, and potentially concerning Iran, while remaining open to diplomatic solutions. It would also be less prone to engaging in the constant political theater aimed at appeasing a far-right, ultranationalist base—as demonstrated by the current government's passage of a law introducing the death penalty for Palestinians convicted of certain terrorist offenses and its proposal to surround prisons holding Palestinian security prisoners with crocodiles. One might consider this an exceptionally low bar. Indeed, Eisenkot himself opposes Palestinian statehood and advocates for continued Israeli security control over Palestinian territory, and the opposition's refusal to collaborate with Arab parties highlights the limitations of the change they offer. Nevertheless, under the present circumstances, altering the political discourse and restoring a degree of normalcy to domestic debate and to Israel’s relations with its regional and international partners could make a significant difference. It could, over time, open the door to more rapid and transformative change, provided the international community maintains active and constructive engagement. In times like these, recognizing that politics is the art of the possible and holding a new government accountable for the direction and pace of its promised changes, with a clear sense of urgency, could yield positive outcomes. However, the electorate must first grant this possibility a chance at the ballot box.