Gulf States Urged to Forge Unified Defence Against Escalating Regional Threats

The Gulf states are caught in a regional conflict not of their own making, a confrontation initiated by US and Israeli strikes on Iran that has spiraled into a complex web of proxy wars stretching from the Strait of Hormuz to the Red Sea and Bab Al Mandeb, encompassing Iraq and Yemen. This escalating situation compels the members of the GCC to confront a critical question: will their commitment to collective security evolve from mere communiques into a tangible military deterrent? For decades, Gulf nations have made substantial investments in advanced military capabilities, yet the progress in operational integration has lagged behind. While possessing sophisticated weaponry and established institutions, the crucial element of an integrated collective response remains elusive. Despite existing GCC defence cooperation mechanisms, each member state continues to rely on its independent national defence strategies, even as regional threats increasingly manifest through cross-border armed networks. Consequently, nations boasting some of the world's most advanced arsenals find themselves vulnerable to attacks from armed groups employing drones and missiles that cost a fraction of the interceptors used against them.

GCC Secretary General Jasem Al Budaiwi highlighted that Iran's proxies are a paramount concern. For years, Iran has nurtured armed partners in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, extending its influence and leverage far beyond its borders. While Iran's control over these groups varies and it doesn't orchestrate every attack directly, the strategic outcome is consistent: a series of fronts from which neighboring states can be threatened and depleted. This model poses an escalating danger as pressure mounts on Tehran, particularly if its armed partners become more directly involved in the conflict. Armed non-state actors are now integral to the region's calculations of deterrence, coercion, and negotiation. Civilian airports, seaports, energy installations, and critical infrastructure have all become targets for these groups. Recent Houthi escalations against Saudi Arabia, along with prior attacks and threats against vital facilities in the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, signify a perilous shift, despite the differing actors and circumstances behind each incident. Iran's objective appears to have moved beyond mere exchanges of fire; it now aims to extend conflict into civilian and economic spheres, weaponizing public safety, market stability, trade, and shipping for blackmail. Gulf cities risk becoming battlegrounds for regional rivalries, with civilians and economies treated as legitimate targets by groups unbound by state authority or the laws of armed conflict.

The current crisis presents a stark irony for the Gulf: states that opted for diplomacy and neutrality may still bear the consequences. Non-alignment does not guarantee immunity, and restraint alone is insufficient to deter actors who perceive escalation as their primary bargaining tool. The GCC already possesses the framework for collective defence, enshrined in the Joint Defence Agreement, which declares an attack on one member as an attack on all. The council has established the Peninsula Shield Force and a Unified Military Command, alongside various security cooperation mechanisms. The immediate challenge lies in ensuring these structures can effectively counter contemporary security threats, including missile and drone salvos, cyberattacks, and simultaneous assaults on critical infrastructure. The crucial question is whether a joint operational mechanism could respond within hours, rather than weeks, if multiple Gulf capitals faced an attack on the same day. For the GCC, the efficacy of collective defence hinges on its military cooperation's ability to credibly deter potential aggressors. Armed groups are not deterred by condemnations or post-incident solidarity; deterrence is achieved when an aggressor understands that attacking one Gulf state means confronting an integrated defence system, not just an individual nation's response. This necessitates a transition from coordination to integration. Practically, this involves fully operationalizing the Unified Military Command with the authority to direct joint responses, linking early-warning and air and missile defence systems across all six GCC states, and establishing real-time intelligence sharing mechanisms. It also requires developing joint plans for protecting critical infrastructure—airports, ports, energy facilities, and desalination plants—and enhancing shared counter-drone and cyber-defence capabilities. Increased investment in regional defence industries would further diminish reliance on external suppliers.

Some might argue that bolstering Gulf joint defence could escalate tensions with Iran. However, the very purpose of deterrence is to prevent conflict. Robust, integrated defences can enhance the Gulf states' capacity to safeguard their interests and pursue diplomacy from a position of strength, thereby reducing their susceptibility to coercion and prolonged attrition. The GCC's existing defence structures, including the Joint Defence Agreement, the Peninsula Shield Force, and the Unified Military Command, provide a foundation for collective security. The critical need is to make these structures operationally effective against modern threats like missile and drone attacks, cyber warfare, and coordinated assaults on vital infrastructure. The goal is to enable a rapid, integrated response, moving from coordination to true integration. This includes empowering the Unified Military Command, linking defence systems, and improving intelligence sharing and joint planning for critical infrastructure protection. Strengthening shared counter-drone and cyber-defence capabilities, alongside investing in regional defence industries, are also key steps. The message to Iran must be clear: normal relations cannot coexist with the arming of groups that threaten regional stability. Respect for sovereignty and de-escalation are paramount, and pressure through proxies must cease. The greatest risk is the Gulf becoming a theater for external powers to settle their accounts. The GCC leaders have an opportunity to convene a dedicated summit to make binding decisions on activating joint defence, empowering the Unified Military Command, and establishing an integrated crisis response system. Collective defence requires immediate action, not delayed implementation until the next crisis. Building shared institutional strength to deter attacks is more effective than mirroring Iran's proxy model or engaging in a war of attrition. True collective security is built on credible deterrence, not just statements or good intentions, ensuring that peace is not merely a prelude to further conflict.