Potential Trump-Xi-Putin Summit: What's at Stake and What's Not


This story, titled "What a Trump-Xi-Putin summit could mean – and what it wouldn’t" First published on Al Jazeera English and was retrieved from its original source on November 6, 2026.
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An unprecedented three-way meeting between United States President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin could occur on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen, China, this month. China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning confirmed that China is in communication with relevant parties regarding such a meeting, with coordination efforts underway. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov also indicated that work is in progress to finalize the meeting in the coming days.
President Trump has expressed openness to trilateral talks, particularly focusing on nuclear weapons, stating he would participate if President Xi desired. While the three leaders have met individually, a formal joint meeting has never taken place. The potential summit, tentatively scheduled for November 18-19, raises questions about its implications for global affairs.
According to Alexander Bratersky, a Moscow-based journalist and political analyst, Russia could achieve at least a significant photo opportunity. He noted that Pyotr Tolstoy, chairman of the Russian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, has likened the meeting to a new Yalta conference, suggesting it could position Russia to influence the post-war European order. Bratersky believes such a meeting would allow Putin to project strength and influence, potentially sidelining discussions on Ukraine. Being at the table would elevate Putin to a status of "first among equals," enabling him to showcase his role in shaping Europe's security architecture. Any concrete outcomes would underscore China's influence over Russia. Bratersky also suggested that a weaker US leader post-elections might have less leverage, especially if US Democrats continue to support Ukraine. He anticipates that the meeting's success, at least domestically for Putin, would be evident within a month, potentially leading to further discussions at the G20 summit in Miami in December. If no substantial outcomes emerge before Christmas, it would likely be viewed as merely a photo opportunity.
Professor Inderjeet Parmar of City St George’s, University of London, suggests that Trump seeks a high-profile encounter to assert his ability to engage directly with other major powers on his own terms. Such a meeting would allow him to position himself as a key deal-maker, potentially on issues like Ukraine, trade, energy, or arms control. Parmar highlighted the domestic political imperative for Trump to secure a foreign policy "win" following the midterm elections. Images of Trump with Xi and Putin could be used to project American influence, even if the substantive outcomes are limited or symbolic, appealing to his domestic audience and MAGA base.
China appears uninterested in a summit focused on Ukraine. German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier reported that during his meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing, Xi indicated that while a three-way meeting might occur in Shenzhen, it would not be about Ukraine, which he characterized as a European conflict requiring European solutions. China has also signaled reluctance regarding Trump's push for nuclear disarmament talks, stating it is neither fair, reasonable, nor realistic to expect China to participate in such negotiations at this stage.
A trilateral meeting could signify a departure from the post-1945 norm of allied coordination before engaging with Russia or China. Parmar warns that such a standalone meeting risks marginalizing allies and potentially trading their interests. This shift towards "personalized great-power diplomacy" could be concerning. While the Trump administration might aim to create divisions between Russia and China, Parmar considers fears of a formal "G3" to be overstated due to diverging interests on issues like Ukraine, Taiwan, technology, and the global economy. The primary risk, he suggests, lies not in institutionalizing such a group but in normalizing great-power agreements made with minimal consultation, potentially leading to unstable international order and disadvantaging excluded nations.
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