Turkiye's Libya Deal: A Diplomatic Game-Changer in the Eastern Mediterranean?

Istanbul, Turkiye – In a significant shift, Turkiye and the leadership of eastern Libya are forging closer political and military ties, moving from past adversarial positions. This development follows a period of repaired relations between Ankara and Cairo after years of hostility, though a maritime dispute now challenges the extent of these reconciliations.

On Wednesday, Turkiye’s Ministry of National Defence reiterated its proposal for a maritime boundary agreement with Egypt. Ankara estimates that such a deal could grant Egypt over 15,000 sq km (5,790 sq miles) of maritime jurisdiction, a potentially more advantageous outcome for Cairo compared to its 2020 partial maritime agreement with Greece.

This offer emerged just eight days after Libya's eastern-based parliament in Tobruk reversed its long-standing opposition and approved a 2019 maritime agreement between Turkiye and the internationally recognized government in Tripoli. While this agreement delineates maritime jurisdiction areas claimed by Turkiye and Libya, Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt contend that it infringes upon their sovereign rights, a claim Turkiye refutes, asserting its compliance with international law.

A senior Turkish official informed Al Jazeera that the leaders in eastern Libya now recognize Ankara's intentions, stating, “Turkiye is not there to use Libya for its own purposes. From the very beginning, we have supported a policy of one Libya,” emphasizing that the country’s stability and resources should benefit all Libyans.

From Confrontation to Cooperation

Turkiye played a crucial role in repelling a 2019-2020 offensive on Tripoli by forces loyal to renegade military commander Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the eastern government's military forces. Since then, Ankara has expanded its engagement with the eastern Libyan camp while maintaining its ties with Tripoli.

The senior official further revealed that Turkish security personnel stationed in Tripoli maintained contact with eastern Libyan forces even during the conflict, noting, “There has actually been no change in our policy. Only the results it has produced have changed.” This diplomatic outreach has been complemented by military and intelligence exchanges. In May, Defence Minister Yasar Guler met with Saddam Haftar, Khalifa Haftar’s son, and Abdulsalam al-Zoubi, a senior defense official from the Tripoli-based government. Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin met Saddam Haftar in Benghazi on June 23, followed by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s meetings with both Khalifa and Saddam Haftar in August.

A shift in the leadership of Libya’s eastern parliament preceded the maritime vote. On October 6, lawmakers replaced Aguila Saleh as parliament speaker with Al-Salhin Abdelnabi al-Obeidi, who had previously chaired the Libyan-Turkish parliamentary friendship committee.

Galip Dalay, a senior research fellow at Chatham House, views Ankara’s engagement with its former adversaries as a significant strategic gain. “This is not merely a pragmatic or tactical gain. It is a strategic gain for Turkiye,” he told Al Jazeera, arguing that closer relations with both Libyan factions complicate efforts to establish Eastern Mediterranean energy and security arrangements that exclude Turkiye.

What Does Eastern Libya Gain?

The rapprochement also reflects political calculations within the Haftar camp. Tarek Megerisi, a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, suggests that Saddam Haftar may be seeking Ankara’s influence to bolster his own political aspirations, given the belief that he ultimately aims to lead Libya.

The senior Turkish official stated that Ankara has made no specific political commitments to eastern Libyan officials beyond general principles of cooperation that would also benefit Libya. Reports from Libyan media indicate that representatives from both Libyan camps held talks in Ankara on Friday regarding the unification of their military structures, although differences over political oversight remain unresolved, and no final agreement has been announced.

Anas El Gomati, director of the Sadeq Institute, cautioned that an understanding between Libya’s rival leaders might not necessarily lead to an inclusive political settlement, warning, “An elite bargain between two camps can leave out everyone beyond them.”

Egypt: The Diplomatic Balancing Act

The Libyan eastern parliament’s decision has also complicated Egypt's diplomatic position. Cairo has historically supported the eastern Libyan leadership but opposes the maritime agreement it has now endorsed.

On October 22, Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis announced discussions with Egypt about extending their 2020 partial maritime delimitation agreement eastward towards Cyprus. Four days later, Egypt joined Greece, Cyprus, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and the European Union in a United Nations statement rejecting the Turkiye-Libya accord.

Despite this, Cairo and Ankara continue to strengthen their relationship. Turkiye’s land forces commander, General Metin Tokel, arrived in Egypt on Monday for an official visit, and the Turkish Defence Ministry announced a joint naval exercise in Alexandria scheduled from November 4 to 9.

The senior Turkish official reiterated to Al Jazeera that Ankara remains open to cooperation on maritime boundaries and energy but is resolute in defending its perceived rights. “Just as other countries say they will not give up the rights they recognise as their own, the same applies to Turkiye,” the official stated.

Foreign Minister Fidan has acknowledged Egypt’s concerns and discussed potential cooperation with Italy. However, the official clarified that no formal four-country negotiating mechanism involving Turkiye, Libya, Italy, and Egypt has been established.

El Gomati believes Cairo’s influence over decisions in eastern Libya has diminished, stating, “Egypt still has influence, but it no longer has a veto.” Megerisi, meanwhile, suggests that Turkiye’s relationship with Egypt is too significant to be jeopardized by the maritime dispute, seeing potential for accommodation, possibly involving Italy’s energy company Eni, which has interests in both Egypt and Libya.

A Breakthrough with Limits

Greece maintains that the maritime agreement disregards the rights of its islands, including Crete. Turkiye counters these claims by arguing that islands should not automatically carry the same weight as mainland coastlines when determining maritime boundaries and exclusive economic zones.

Megerisi commented that the eastern Libyan parliament’s approval strengthens the agreement’s domestic legal standing but does little to resolve the broader dispute among Eastern Mediterranean nations. “I think both sides are maximalist,” he observed.

While the parliamentary vote grants Ankara increased political leverage, it does not resolve competing maritime claims or pave the way for offshore energy exploration. Turkiye now aims to leverage its gains in Libya and its improving ties with Egypt to bolster its position in the Eastern Mediterranean, seeking to forge new partnerships and regional cooperation rather than being excluded from arrangements primarily shaped by Greece, Cyprus, and Israel.

Achieving this goal necessitates finding common ground with nations that continue to challenge Turkiye’s maritime claims. The senior Turkish official indicated that the improved relationship with Cairo has facilitated direct discussions on these differences. “We can now discuss every issue with Egypt, and we will discuss this one too,” the official said. “We do not have to seek the approval or consent of unrelated third countries.”